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INTRODUCTION 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command has been engaged in a long and continuing 
effort directed toward making the fullest possible use of new and appropriate technol· 
ogies. In 1967, the command engaged the services of faculty at the Naval Postgraduate 
School to aid in this effort in whatever way possible. Since that time, there has been a 
coordinated and continuing activity between the Assistant Commander for Research and 
Development, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters in Washington, DC, 
the Civil Engineering Laboratory at Port Hueneme, California, the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, and the California State University, Sacramento, California 
to analyze ways by which the flow of R&D results can be accelerated into use. During 
this time, there has also been continuing support from the office of the Director of Navy 
Laboratories and the office of Information, Naval Material Command. 
A review of research in 1975 was directed toward enhancing the utilization of the 
research and development investments and was presented to a small group at the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters. One of the attendees at the presentation 
suggested that a description of this research effort might be of widespread interest. 
Accordingly, a symposium was conducted later that year at the Headquarters of the 
Naval Material Command in which some of the research results were presented. The 
proceedings of that symposium entitled Technology Transfer in Research and Develop-
ment were published in December, 1975. 
With emerging research results, a greater understanding of information flow has come 
in general and, in particular, of that in the Navy Civil Engineering Community. There has 
been a resulting change in the knowledge utilization of research objectives. Early efforts 
were directed principally toward the improvement of the documentation and distribution 
systems then in use. It became apparent that movement of information into use involved 
many factors besides documentation and its distribution, so effort was directed toward 
flow models. Many such models, which were contributed by researchers in many fields, 
were analyzed to determine the basic elements common to all. Resulting is the nine-
element model which was described in Technology Transfer in Research and Development, 
and which is referred to by the participants in this symposium. 
The work on information flow continues, but recent efforts have been directed toward 
interactions between the flow elements and how they impact on practical operational 
organizational entities. It was early recognized that the management of information is of 
primary concern to the top level executives in any organization, and that success is 
closely related to successful implementation of the new and discrete retention or discard 
of the old methods. In this regard "the new" is taken to mean any change, whether 
it be technologies, systems, equipment, organizational arrangement, or any other ideas 
considered to be ready for implementation. 
Who carries the responsibility for staying current and pioneering profitable new 
frontiers? Obviously, this is management's job with descending responsibility from the 
chief executive down. It is also a responsibility of varying degree for different organiza-
tional elements. 
It has long been recognized by the research group at the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command that its responsibilities toward innovation and technology usage lay in finding 
out needs, supplying technology to fulfill the needs from sources. both within and with· 
out the command, and in the research of methodologies to bring about cooperative effort 
between various segments of the parent organization. Of primary concern has been a 
focus on making sure that the R&D organizations at headquarters and at the laboratory 
were doing their part. This effort has caused the R&D segments to recognize needed 
cooperation from others if effective utilization of the results of R&D investments is to be 
accomplished. 
A considerable amount of research and application has been conducted since the 1975 
symposium and the publication of its proceedings. Again, the need to present some of 
the results became apparent. The present symposium sponsored by the Naval Material 
Command and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has as its intent to bring to the 
attention of the audience some of the developments in the field. 
v 
A great deal of support and progress in the area of research result utilization has 
come from others. In an effort to show some of the outstanding activity from others, 
representatives from the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, have been asked to make presentations. 
The first talk by Milon Essoglou is entitled Technology Transfer and User Stimu-
lation: A Manager's Perspective. Mr. Essoglou is an experienced R&D manager who has 
had a leading role in the Naval Facitilies Engineering Command direction of its Tech· 
nology Transfer effort since before the start of the Postgraduate School involvement. 
He presents some interesting viewpoints and challenges. 
Tom Sullivan follows with a talk entitled Using Organizational Mechanisms to En-
courage Innovation. Mr. Sullivan is also concerned with the manager's responsibility 
toward effective innovation. He indicates traps in which managers can get enmeshed 
and ways to become unsnarled. 
Tim Rohrer has been the R&D Washington office contact for the research result 
utilization project for many years. He has made considerable contributions toward 
keeping the project on track. He is joined by Tom Buckles in the next presentation 
which outlines in three parts the various efforts which have been made at the Post-
graduate School. In Part I, Mr. Rohrer and Mr. Buckles describe the basic model around 
which the various studies have been built then proceed to show which model elements 
are addressed by various studies with a spatial diagram. 
Recognition should be given that many other organizations share the concern for 
effective information usage. Glenn Haney from the U.S. Forest Service and Bruce Reiss 
from the National Science Foundation describe programs and objectives for their re· 
spective organizations. Mr. Haney describes the three arm organization of the Forest 
Service and the planning underway for effective utilization of the nations forest covered 
lands. Mr. Reiss describes the various knowledge utilization networks sponsored by the 
National Science Foundation. These networks have the purpose of helping government 
agencies at all levels to keep abreast of usable technology. 
Sixth in order is Fred Hueber from the Naval Material Command. Captain Hueber 
explains some of the technology transfer implications and complications of internation· 
al involvement in military aquisition processes. 
One of the least understood elements of the Technology Transfer model is "capacity". 
Jim Jolly's work presented here is previously unpublished. Dr. Jolly provides much 
insight into capacity building. His work provides another leg to the spatial diagram in 
an area which has had little prior treatment. 
Wrap-up is by Al Arcuni. Commander Arcuni champions cooperative effort. He 
takes a positive stand toward using all appropriate means to technology effectively. 
He urges that all in managerial positions recognize their responsibility to the taxpayers 
to use research resources wisely. 
Monterey, Califomia, U.S.A. 
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & USER STIMULATION: 
AN R&D MANAGER'S PERSPECTIVE 
by 
M. E. Essoglou, Senior Technologist 
Assistant Commander for Research and Development 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters 
Washington, D.C. 
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A manager is constantly immersed in today's activity. Yet, this immersion can asphyx-
iate him if he can't get a break to look at yesterday and project tomorrow. This is precisely 
what senior management seeks to achieve when they ask for plans for the future and an 
accounting of results achieved. In my organization, we report some kind of numbers 
which are presumably measures of technology transfer achieved and similarly we report 
our goals for next year. These numbers are reviewed annually with quarterly sub-reviews. 
Thus, our top management fosters technology transfer. To my knowledge, no one else 
outside the R&D community in our organization is reviewed as to technology transfer, 
achieved or planned. Figure 1 shows our Command's organizational structure. Notice 
that R&D must serve the entire Command and specifically must push the transfer of 
technology. My perspective on technology transfer, apart from contact with external 
sources and associations, derives from thirteen years in the R&D "shop" of the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command. 
We may be reaching the limits for pinning the exclusive responsibility for technology 
transfer on the R&D Division. During NAVFAC's iteration of attempts to deal with 
problems of mismatch between input and output in the reservoir of technology (whose 
rising levels were viewed with alarm back in the sixties) the R&D manager seemed to 
be the logical guy to ping on. R&D managers have been particularly visible and vulner-
able on matters concerning the utilization of research results. At the same time, they 
have been sufficiently idealistic to be "drawn" into the lead role for technology transfer 
efforts in organizations. 
I am not saying that we have done wrong by our concern over the issues and problems 
of getting our laboratory technology transferred into useful applications. Much of it has 
been and is our responsibility, especially for those of us in the R&D sector operating with 
public funds. The growth of technology transfer awareness, if not actual growth in the 
transfer rates, parallels our society's awareness of the R&D investment and the need to 
use results effectively. As society demanded more accounting by science and technology 
for its accomplishment, productivity and worth, we in R&D management developed a 
number of "technology transfer models" to guide us into more effective management 
actions and to provide a means for studying the so called "technology barrier problem". 
We have been asked repeatedly "What good are you to the organization's production?" 
We have sought to justify our existence - as if it were necessary - by attempting to show 
that our innovation output flows into our operating divisions where it is productively 
utilized. 
This conference is full of R&D producers and certainly lots of technology pushers. To 
all of you, I say: We may be reaching practical and affordable limits of "technology 
push", at least as we have practiced it to date. Technology push is a more appropriate 
way of describing what most of us have been doing. We have been buiding more and 
more powerful transmitters to beam our messages over more and more frequencies. The 
atmosphere is full of waves containing the messages of the technology products generated 
in our laboratories. We have done this unilaterally in response to earlier criticisms that 
our transmissions were so tuned as to be receivable only by those possessing the scientific 
and technical code of understanding the technical "jargon" which, while adequate for 
peer group communication, is inadequate for reaching users. But I think this is less true 
today because of what we have done e.g., publications and information services. 
We R&D producers have been "operating radio stations" but we have no control 
over the "receiving radio sets" let alone the behavior and actions of our "listeners". 




I l J I I 
NAVSEA NAVAIR NAVSUP NAVELEX NAVFAC 
I 
w I I I I 
06 09A 09B 09P 
MILITARY READWESS AQUISITION FAC. MGMT. PLANNING 
I 
83 
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
FIGURE 1. Organizational Structure of Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
that old cliche once again! Only top management can formulate policy and authorize 
resources for adequate "reception sets" and for "listening". They can economize total 
organizational resources by seeing that R&D "transmissions" and user "receptions" are 
matched as much as possible. We have been working from the transmission end mainly. 
It is the user, however, who can make the crucial and critical decisions towards imple-
mentation at the production level. I suggest that the future burden for technology trans-
fer be shared more equally between users as well as R&D producers. 
I am not proposing that we in R&D cut back on our broadcasting efforts. We have 
learned over the years quite a lot about how to "beam our messages" to our customers. I 
am not proposing that we terminate our "snooping" in finding out the needs and recep-
tion capabilities of our customers. After all, we are not quite perfect and there is still 
room to improve. However, if we look at a hypothetical curve of technology transfer 
effectiveness as a function of effort expended then I think that we, "the pushers" of 
technology, are past the steep rise, while our customers, "the pullers", are still down at 
the concave up region. Figure 2 is intended to show that a given dollar expenditure in 
technology transfer in a government organization today may have more payoff if spent 
on the receiving or pulling end rather than the pushing end. It is only top management 
(i.e., the management level next above the R&D and operating divisions) that can deter-
mine that such expenditure of effort be shifted from the R&D producer to the operating 
user. 
Practically speaking, however, this does not seem likely to happen in the near future 
in the type of organization that I represent. The top management level (Figure 1) does 
not seem to have the requisite degree of awareness or interest. We know that interest 
develops if something is pertinent to one's well being. Interest exists also in the reason-
ably familiar aspects yet novel. That technology transfer is not among the elements most 
pertinent to top management's well being in a government organization is another thesis 
which I would like to propose for your consideration and discuss next. 
The head of an agency is ultimately accountable through the President to Congress for 
the proper expenditures of moneys received. This is the primary concern, and properly 
so. We all should know that Gongress appropriates R&D funds distinct and separate from 
funds for construction of facilities, procurement of ships or aircraft, maintenance and 
operation, personnel, etc. As long as management can report that these funds have been 
properly spent for the authorized purpose, management has done its most important job. 
This is so because the improper expenditure of funds is an offense which can hurt an 
individual far more than somewhat inefficiently conceived projects or activities. There-
fore, our organizations and our accounting and reporting systems are those that are most 
suitable to account for expenditures along appropriation lines. Technology transfer 
activities fall in the no-man's land between appropriation boundaries. These activities are 
neither R&D nor procurement or maintenance. Therefore, in the final analysis, the 
head of an agency is not forced to review the technology transfer performance activity in 
a visible way. Given far more pressure on him than he has resources, "technology transfer" 
is not his primary concern. He does not have the tools of accountability and organization 
geared up to assist him (with the possible exceptions of young agencies such as a NASA, 
DOE, etc). Usually his only tools are to urge or direct coordination between the mana-
gers of R&D and the managers of non-R&D activities. Even at the lower levels - say 
divisions or program managers - coordinated actions between users and producers of 
R&D are still secondary to our insuring proper accountability of expenditures consis-
tent with the intent of the appropriation. 










FlGURE 2. Hypothetical Curve of Technology Transfer Effectiveness vs Effort 
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other background we manage to fine tune our transmissions to the user's reception 
network, then good things may happen - otherwise forget it. The likelihood of this 
commonality is remote since the people who aspire for R&D seem to differ from those 
who aspire for operations. 
Having gone full circle, we arrive at what has been known for a long time among those 
concerned with the communication of technology: 
Even if the message transmission and reception are physically perfect, communica-
tion does not necessarily take place because of mismatched value orientations of the 
R&D and operations personnel. 
This was first reported in 1966, to my knowledge, and confirmed by other researchers 
looking at barriers or facilitators of technology transfer again and again. Is there any 
relief in sight? 
A continuing and increased effort to match as closely as possible the value orientation 
of the R&D and non-R&D elements of an organization seems the only logical course. 
This can best take place during personnel hiring and perhaps in personnel training. I say 
"perhaps" because organizationally inspired/directed training to someone in mid-career 
life is not likely to effect significant changes in the attitudes and values needed in the 
technology transfer communication game. Certainly, sensitivity training to technology 
transfer is better than no training at all. However, it is best to select someone who already 
has the sensitivity and values such that he can receive or transmit technology messages 
effectively. This too seems unlikely since people hire like people. The R&D'people hire 
R&D types, the construction people hire construction types, etc. 
Who or what can break this inbreeding? We must again turn to top management. 
Again, I see them in a mood to delegate. The hiring for the R&D shop is up to the 
administrator for R&D and the hiring for the maintenance shop is up to the administrator 
for Maintenance. For example, I am not aware in my Command that a position descrip-
tion (PD) is ever reviewed and commented on by anyone not in the line chain with the 
exception of "staff" personnel specialists. I am suggesting, perhaps naively, that we start 
requiring that certain PD's and personnel selection criteria include requirements for aware-
ness of technology transfer potential. I know, and so do some of you, of the conflict 
and problems created between the R&D division and the non-R&D division when a non-
R&D PD contains reference to R&D. It is usually thought of as duplication. This can be 
turned around simply by using more precise terminology in specifying what we want a 
user to do with respect to R&D. We want him to pull R&D and not simply to "monitor" 
or some other vague notion. 
Perhaps there has been too much said on technology transfer by those of us in the 
"push game" and not enough response by those of you in operations. It may be that 
those in operations are already doing their best" to "receive messages" from the R&D 
community. Possibly, they are already pulling anything and everything worth pulling 
according to· their estimation and their risk orientation. Can we enthusiasts of R&D 
technology transfer pass objective judgment as to the adequacy of their receiving efforts? 
Am I right in my basic proposition that the time has come for the non-R&D types to 
assume a greater share of the technology transfer burden by pulling for application of 
R&D in their products. I'll look for evidence from you in support of or contrary to my 
thesis in the years to come. I'd like to hear from those of you out there after you have 





We must be cautious not to equate the non-reception of the technology message from 
the corporate, organizational or Federal laboratory/laboratories with technological slug-
gishness on the part of operations personnel. We Federal R&D types must remember that 
our customer is just as free to shop from whatever "source" as he desires just as any cus-
tomer in a free market. His failure to patronize our labs must not be misinterpreted as 
his deficiency. Similarly, we must not let it drive us into excessive costly efforts of 
pushing our output. We must, however, be constantly examining our output's quality 
and perhaps our marketing style. 
In my organization, the only evidence of a conducive technology pull environment 
that I see is one where only the individuals in operations are either intelligently sympa-
thetic to R&D or where.they are in trouble and R&D has more promise than other re-
sources at their disposal for getting them out of trouble. The rest is a one-way paper 
transmission from R&D to operations much like seeds landing in a patch of barren soil. 
While we are spreading the seeds, someone should assure their proper burial, temperature, 
and humidity for their eventual growth. It cannot be expected that R&D produce a 
"seed" so hardy as to be able to survive and flourish on barren soil. It is for the non-
R& D sector to prepare the ground and care for the planted "seed". 
Since I am in R&D and not at the next higher level of my Command management 
structure, I need to concern myself with the R&D resources at my Command. Therefore, 
my concern is whether I am doing too much, not enough, or the proper amount of method-
ology with respect to technology push. Technology pull is not in our charter and I don't 
believe it is in the charter of the other ten or so equal-level management elements of our 
organization. My boss is the Program Manager for the Command's R&D Program and, 
in that capacity, he advises our "Chief" on R&D matters through two intermediate 
superiors. Only those higher levels have sufficient span to affect integration of R&D 
across the entire organization. In reality, integrating push/pull effort is negotiated at the 
much lower levels where interpersonal compatability makes things happen or nor happen. 
Practically speaking, there is no policy or direction bringing about the push-pull technol-
ogy transfer events. Any attempt on my part to do organizational research in the non-
R&D sectors of my organization is viewed as snooping or an intrusion into their business. 
The next-in-line management levels do not believe in the worth of technology transfer 
enhancement activities other than the "push mode". One of the risks of doing research 
on technology transfer is that the results can be construed as "critical" of people and 
procedures in the receiver's organization. 
In closing, I must follow the tradition of all researchers. I recommend that we in R&D 
undertake to "research" the receiving end of technology transfer. Are they receiving? 
Does anything need to be done to increase the technology reception capacity of our 
users while doing our "push" thing. My last graphic, Figure 3, is intended to focus your 
attention on the relative roles of pushers or producers, and pullers or receivers, using the 
basic Jolly-Creighton model about which you will hear more from speakers that follow. 
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Today's manager operates in an environment fraught with problems of decreasing 
resources, declining numbers of personnel and reduced budgets. He or she is expected to 
overcome these obstacles through resourceful improvements in efficiency or effectiveness. 
One alternative which can achieve these goals is innovation. 
What is innovation? Innovation is not a technological advancement. Innovation is the 
process of applying a given technology to areas other than those for which it was original-
ly designed. It requires imagination, the ability to organize, and the skills necessary to 
overcome skeptics and detractors. Stockfish [Ref. 13] describes the following five gen-
eral characteristics of the innovation process: 
1. An innovation is often made possible by some technological improvement; not 
necessarily directed towards its eventual application. 
2. An innovation often requires organizational changes. 
3. Innovations can often entail a change in the status quo among specialized sub-
groups within the larger organization. 
4. Innovations are most likely to occur after an organization has experienced some 
external force or shock .. 
5. Although most innovations have a technological foundation, some occur as a 
result of changes in the social environment. 
It is obvious from the above description that timing, personalities, and 'organizational 
environment play extremely important roles in the innovative process. Upper manage-
ment's influence in these areas is critical to the establishment of an atmosphere which 
encourages the use of innovation. Without management support, this resource becomes 
neglected and opportunities for organizational and functional improvements are lost. 
Unfortunately, innovation falls in the category of many similar activities. The con-
cepts and philosophy behind utilizing innovation are beyond reproach. Discussions on 
the topic will normally result in positive responses from chief executives. They fully 
agree with the rationale for its use and verbally support its implementation. Active 
pursuit of the objective, however, rarely occurs. Innovation becomes relegated to the list 
of needs titled "Nice to Have" and is thereby excluded from the mandatory requirements 
group. Innovation must.compete with more pressing activities and, therefore, becomes 
one more burden for management. Since the urgency for innovation is not defined and 
management incentives do not exist; it can be perpetually delayed. 
The process is not peculiar to innovation. It affects many other activities which are 
also vying for executive attention. Its frequency is a function of the number of individu-
als marketing their specific interests at a given point in time. 
Understanding this process can be helpful. If a special activity, i.e. innovation, can 
provide benefits to the organization, then it behooves the chief executive not only to be 
aware of the process, but to interrupt the natural cycle. The executive's efforts should be 
directed toward converting innovation into a viable corporate objective and thereby 
causing it to effectively compete with existing urgent needs. 
The purpose of this study is to examine this process and determine how innovation 
can be exploited by setting up appropriate organizational mechanisms. The assumption is 
made that once an activity is institutionalized, it no longer has to compete for attention. 
It becomes increasingly self-perpetuating, especially if the promised benefits materialize. 
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Innovation: Organizational Incentives 
Inherent in any organization are incentives which affect an individual's attitude toward 
innovation. These incentives can be categorized as either negative or positive. Positive 
incentives are those which encourage the use of innovation. They might include increased 
visibility, improved professional standing, promotions, and advancement. Successful 
innovators normally expect to receive one or more of these rewards for their efforts. 
In direct contrast are the negative incentives. They can include non-recognition, fear 
of failure, loss of promotion, or even separation if the innovation is unsuccessful. Nega-
tive incentives usually outweigh positive ones. In addition, the most drastic negative 
incentive, separation, is far more dramatic than any of the positive incentives. Therefore, 
most organizations experience a much stronger influence by the negative factors with 
consequent minimal innovative activity. 
Innovation: Management Incentives 
In order to counteract the negative factors, management must become actively involved.-
Through careful evaluation and persistent suppression of the negative incentives, an 
environment conducive to innovative activities can be developed. This approach seems 
rather simple and straightforward. It is, therefore, important to examine the realities of 
the situation. 
Like the innovators themselves, management is faced with the dilemma of not having 
strong motivational factors which would cause them to pursue innovation. Their view is 
one of seeing innovation as an additional burden. While it is agreed that innovation is 
needed, the actions necessary to achieve the end product require the diversion of time 
and resources from current needs. Resources and time are always limited. The executive 
is normally constrained to addressing immediate and urgent concerns; consequently, 
innovation will be put off to a "more apportune time." In reality, "a more opportune 
time" never occurs. Innovation becomes a luxury that can be had only if the resources 
and time ever become available. 
This syndrome occurs at all levels of management. It is perhaps most serious when 
exhibited by the chief executive. His or her time is most valuable and usually in the 
shortest supply. There is a continuum of individuals and groups trying to obtain chief 
executive support for their particular interests. If their requests are logical and have merit, 
they are usually accorded an opportunity to plead their case. Seldom do their requests 
generate any action responses. At best, they receive verbal support and assurance that 
future decisions will include careful consideration of their recommendations. 
Innovation: An Action Model for the Chief Executive 
Ideally, the chief executive utilizes all available resources, including innovation, to 
attain corporate objectives. He insures that the organizational ennvironment is recep-
tive to innovation and aggressively pursues innovations which might result in major 
improvements. 
Unfortunately, the ideal rarely occurs. The process breaks down and innovation be-
comes a lost resource. A schematic representation of innovation being rejected from the 
chief executive's work sphere is shown in Figure 1. The inner circle represents the chief 
executive. The area surrounding the inner circle, the penetration barrier, is a shell which 
buffers out elements which are not considered urgent or mandatory. The incoming 
arrows are requests for chief executive action and/or attention. They originate from 
various corporate activities, needs, and special interests. If they are successful in crossing 























If they fail to pierce the barricade, a non-action response occurs. The response may be 
positive and supportive in nature but is totally verbal in content. No organizational 
changes are generated nor is the topic seriously discussed until the next penetration 
effort occurs. 
The penetration barrier performs a function comparable to that of a diode in an 
electronic circuit. It effectively blocks all incoming current from the anode unless the 
electrical potential is sufficient to break through the barrier. In the model, a break-
through will happen only when the intruder has enough energy in the form of political 
clout or disruptive influence to adversely impact the organization if action is not forth-
coming. 
The amount of energy needed to cross the barrier is directly proportional to the size 
of the organization. Large companies tend to generate a large field of forces due to their 
complexity, number of employees, impact on the community and the local economy. 
Many of these forces have inherent priority of entry and must be admitted. These 
actions reduce the amount of time available for intruder activities. Lower level intruders 
have a more difficult time making contact, let alone penetrating the barrier. 
For the same reasons, the shell thickness is directly proportional to the quantity of 
current intruders. As the number goes up, the screening process completely eliminates 
elements with lesser priorities. The less important intruders must evolve to a state of 
higher energy before they can hope to establish initial communication. 
Successful intruders, those able to penetrate the barrier, have several common traits. 
They normally have a direct impact on the corporate product or directly affect the 
executive's performance. Generally, ignoring the high priority intruder will result in an 
unwanted event which will adversely affect production or the executive's career. It is, 
therefore, easier to respond at the time of intrusion than to suffer the consequences of 
non-action. The successful intruder usually has direct access to the chief executive and is 
able to attract executive attention when needed. 
Unsuccessful intruders also have common characteristics. They lack major representa-
tion within the organization and do not have the ability to disrupt the production process. 
It is easier to disregard their requests and satisfy their interests with verbal acknowledge-
ments. They can be effectively buffered by sending them to lower level managers when it 
is inconvenient for the chief executive to meet with them. Their requests are usually 
logical, worthy of consideration, and have the potential for corporate benefits if imple-
mented. They are normally thought of as luxuries because the time and resources neces-
sary for implementation are not available under existing priorities. 
Organizational Mechanisms 
Society looks upon the chief executive as the center of power in any organization. 
Theoretically, the corporation is a reflection of his personality and particular manage-
ment style. His desires and preferences are carefully monitored and provide the stimulus 
for management policies throughout the hierarchy. 
Galbraith, in his discussion of The Technostructure, [Ref. 4), presents a different 
picture. He theorizes that corporate and societal power is held by groups within organi-
zations and not by individuals. Executive policy is really a reflection of decisions made 
by groups located throughout the organizational structure. The groups are formal and 
informal and their membership is based on current informational needs for a specific 
decision. 
A similar position is held by Laner. [Ref. 6] He maintains that major changes in 
corporate policies are often a result of pressures applied from the bottom of the organiza-
tion. These changes appear to have originated at the top. In actuality, they occurred 
because a special interest group was able to apply sufficient pressure on the chief execu-
tive to change company goals. In terms of the Chief Executive Action Model, they could 
be labeled as "Successful Intruders" and the change would be an "Action Response." 
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Two examples of this phenomenon are organized labor and civil rights groups pressing 
for equal educational and employment opportunities. Both began, not because of manage-
ment desires, but due to the organized efforts of special interest groups. They started 
with minimal backing and limited support. Their initial requests were ignored and dismis-
sed as not warranting management attention. As they grew in size, stature, and political 
acumen they acquired strength, visibility, and recognition. When they were able to 
demonstrate sound leadership and strong organization, their influence and power could 
no longer be denied. Today, that power is clearly evident in their intimate relationships 
with local, state, and federal officials as well as private executives and corporate leaders. 
The above examples describe the manner in which organizational mechanisms come 
into being, gain acceptance and stability. They illustrate the process of evolution over 
time, from insignificant beginnings to acknowledged centers of influence. Their effective-
ness is attested by the numerous changes in policy throughout private industry and 
government. Many incentives have now been incorporated to ensure that their interests 
are maintained and protected. Few individuals have the power to adversely modify the 
built-in procedures, guidance, and incentives instilled throughout the system. 
Mechanisms and Group Development 
The evolution of these mechanisms is depicted in the Group Development Model 
(Figure 2). The center structure is the Chief Executive Action Model. The inward point-
ing arrows are intrusion attempts by the special interest group and the outward ones are 
responses by the chief executive. 
The three peripheral balls represent a single group which is going through a process of 
growth and development. The evolution is a continuum, but for purposes of discussion it 
is shown in three distinct phases. The Informal Phase (bottom ball) is the birth of the 
group. Characteristically, it is small in the number of individuals involved and has mini-
mal stature. It is probably rather disorganized without a single strong leader and tries to 
capitalize on unplanned opportunities to interface with the chief executive. 
In phase two, the Minor Formal Phase, the group begins to present itself as a defined 
body with established objectives. It now has a title reflective of its constituency. While 
it is better organized, it has difficulty maintaining cohesion. Major activity occurs only 
when a crisis is pending. The remainder of the time the membership performs assigned 
corporate functions and group needs are seldom addressed. Within the corporate organi-
zation, it has achieved a modicum of recognition and can obtain access to the chief execu-
tive upon request. Meetings have to be scheduled well in advance and repeated cancella-
tions are accepted. 
The top and largest ball is the final step, the Major Formal Phase. The group has now 
reached maturity. It has achieved recognition and is armed with political leverage and 
skill. The leadership has established a reputation for its ability to pursue and achieve 
group goals. Continuously active group management and regularly scheduled meetings 
ensure that objectives are addressed systematically and routinely. The group has become 
an organization with strong internal links and its survival is no longer at issue. As long as 
there is a common concern, the group will continue to function. It now has easy access 
to the chief executive. Meetings are scheduled at short notice and executed promptly. 
There may even be an open door policy for critical events. 
Measures of Progress 
There are several indicators which identify the stage of growth that a particular group 
has achieved. They pertain to how and when the group approaches the chief executive, 
and whether or not the group successfully overcomes the penetration barrier. 
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Figure 2: Group Development Model 
15 
In the beginning, the group is unsure of its position and the request is usually in the form 
of a plea for help. During phase two, the group has gained confidence and usually is 
seeking recognition. By phase three, it has experienced numerous successes and its 
requests have become demands. No longer satisfied with having the opportunity to 
discuss its needs, it wants to see positive steps taken toward meeting its demands. If they 
are not forthcoming, then the group is in a position to apply pressure that causes the 
chief executive to feel that it would be easier to comply. 
Another measure of growth is the chief executive's availability to the group. As long 
as the group has to take advantage of unplanned opportunities to establish contact, it is in 
the under-developed state (phase one). This is followed by recognition (phase two) and 
the ability to request and schedule meetings at the executive's convenience. It finally 
converts into an open door relationship (phase three). By this time, the group has demon-
strated its political prowess and has established a feeling of mutual respect. This will 
occur only when the chief executive has come to anticipate or experience the adverse 
consequences of being inattentive to group demands. 
The last and most obvious measure is the group's faculty to overcome the penetration 
barrier. Only when it has achieved prominence within the organizational community will 
it be able to cross the barrier and stimulate an action response. Penetration failures place 
the group somewhere in the earlier growth stages. This measure, therefore, is only a 
means of evaluating the achievement of the Major Formal Phase and does not locate the 
group in a specific stage of earlier development. 
Use of Innovation Groups 
If an innovation group is to be formed, the following question needs attention: Who 
would be interested in group involvement? 
The group should be comprised of individuals who have experienced the problems 
associated with an environment which is non-receptive to innovation. Previous frustra-
tions will provide the motivation necessary to vigorously pursue innovation objectives. 
Shared experiences will instill a common thread into their personal goals and ideas. 
Membership should also include anyone with an expressed or demonstrated interest in the 
innovative process. Membership should not be limited to a specialized group. It should 
include all skills and professions thereby establishing a strong and diversified base. 
The total number of people involved is also an important factor. Size is directly 
proportional to the future bargaining position of the group. Hopefully, the group will 
contain people with previous leadership experience and existing organizational influence. 
The duration of the growth cycle will depend on the backgrounds and abilities of the 
founding members. Credible individuals respected throughout the corporate structure 
can be a tremendous asset during the early phases. People knowledgeable in the political 
process can take advantage of timing and critical events to shorten the path to the major 
formal position. 
Protecting the Innovation Group During Development 
During the early growth phases, the innovation group is susceptible to attack from 
non-supportive organizational elements. Adversaries with minimal power will not be able 
to negate group advances. If, however, the attacker is another group or individual operat-
ing from a higher energy level, it could adversely affect the growth process. Therefore, it 
is necessary to provide protection during the earlier stages of development. The amount 
of protection will depend on their adversaries' overall strengths and the group's ability to 
counter aggressions. The requirements for protection are more pronounced in the begin-




Group protection is most effective when administered by a high-ranking manager. 
Many early attacks will be eliminated if the entire corporate organization is aware that a 
senior manager will defend and actively support the innovation group. In addition, 
the protector's management skills will allow him to accurately evaluate the opposition's 
strengths. This will insure that management support is only supplied when needed. The 
group must be allowed to struggle independently when the probability for loss is mini-
mized. Minor skirmishes provide valuable opportunities to develop political skills. 
The individual selected to sponsor the group should have several attributes. Someone 
with a strong interest in innovation would be a logical choice. The sponsor must be 
placed high in the organization and respected throughout the corporate structure. He 
must have communicative and political skills to evaluate and handle confrontations. 
Since the implied threat is usually more effective than direct action, sponsor involvement 
should be minimized. Activity should be limited to ~he amount necessary to warn detrac-
tors that support will be provided if it is needed. Any additional protection should occur 
only if a major confrontation is imminent. Rotating the assignment among several key 
individuals might provide additional benefits. Not only is the protective umbrella strength-
ened, but an early management awareness of the value of innovation can result. A 
general concern for innovation at the higher management levels will accelerate the later 
effects of the organizational mechanism. 
Objectives of Innovation Groups 
Innovation group objectives could span a wide range of needs. Hopefully, they will 
include the elimination of innovation barriers and the establishment of organizational 
incentives. Group activities must eventually focus on these two areas. Major changes 
in the innovative environment will result when the barriers are removed and positive 
incentives are established. 
Because innovation barriers involve people, they are very sensitive to changes. One 
type of barrier is the individual who is happy with the status quo and does not want to 
see it disrupted. He views all change as bad and sees innovation as creating chaos and 
imposing an unwarranted increase in workload. When this person is organizationally 
placed directly above an innovator, creativity is stifled and often eliminated. The group 
is, therefore, interested in removing the barrier and providing freedom for the innovative 
process. It can maneuver to either neutralize the individual or have him relocated. 
A well-developed group may be able to achieve neutralization by demonstrating its 
strength. If it can cause the manager to feel that he lacks support and represents a 
minority position, the manager will frequently stop his barrier tactics. If the person is 
high in the management hierarchy, the group may lobby for his relocation or removal. 
Pressure is applied to the chief executive and other high-ranking managers who are 
supportive to the innovative cause. United management support can be used to isolate 
the individual from his peers. The pressure will eventually cause the individual to revise 
his position or experience adverse management actions. 
Another type of barrier, and also a major concern of the innovation group, is pre-
mature evaluation [Ref. 5]. It occurs when an innovation is subjected to criticism or 
attack before it has had a chance to yield any benefits. Appraisal normally comes from 
peers. and organizational competitors who may not have a vested interest in the innova-
tion. Their main thrust is to diminish the innovator's professional standing. Frequently, 
they feel threatened by the results of the innovative process. Premature evaluation can 
result in the innovation not being carried to its maximum potential. It may lead to the 
scrapping of an innovation which could have produced major improvements. The inno-
vation group can be effective by exposing the attacks and soliciting management support 
for control and elimination. 
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One way of minimizing this activity is to involve a maximum number of people in 
the innovation. Making innovation a group effort can provide multiple benefits. When 
all of the people who stand to gain from the innovation feel responsible for its success, 
there will be fewer individuals remaining as potential critics. Responsibility will be 
more widely distributed and the probability of success increased. Individuals who would 
have been the most knowledgeable opponents of the project will have been eliminated 
and any remaining adversaries will have to operate without the benefits of first-hand 
information. 
Positive organizational incentives play an important role in the innovative environment. 
They are tied directly to the reward system and are a reflection of management priorities. 
The innovation group, like many other groups, is interested in seeing that the reward 
system recognizes their cause. A primary objective is to insure that innovation becomes 
not only an excepted practice but an expected activity. This can only occur when the 
reward system encourages innovation. 
Organizational incentives usually go through an evolutionary process. The first man-
agement concessions are visibility and recognition via corporate news media and non-cash 
rewards. They enhance an individual's professional standing and bring his or her achieve-
ments to the attention of other functions within the organization. Cash rewards for cost 
savings and exceptional performance are the next level of inducements. When innova-
tions can be tied to improvements, the innovator receives a percentage of the savings. The 
final phase is the establishment of innovation as a criterion for performance appraisals 
and promotional selection. This is the ultimate objective for the innovation group. 
Innovation becomes the norm and not the exception for positions and annual evalua-
tions. 
Executive Innovation Action 
When the innovation group reaches the Major Formal Phase, several changes can be 
expected. The Chief Executive, all levels of management, and the entire organization will 
be affected. The degree of impact will vary with the priority and emphasis placed on 
innovation. 
Changes to the Chief Executive can be analyzed by examining the Modified Chief 
Executive Action Model (Figure 3). The changes to the original model (Figure 2) are a 
result of the pressures applied by the organizational mechanism, the innovation group. 
Once the innovation group penetrates the barrier, the executive's attitude toward innova-
tion begins to change. Unlike other intruders, the group's influence will broaden his 
perspective and make him more receptive to other special interests. This effect is shown 
as a reduction in the width of the penetration barrier. Groups previously excluded from 
entry are now capable of crossing the barrier. The energy needed to obtain executive 
action has been reduced. In order to accommodate these new interests, previously suc-
cessful intruders will be displaced. Redefined priorities will make room for the new 
activities. Activities previously handled by the chief executive will be delegated to 
lower level managers. Along with delegation goes the need for frequent chief executive 
involvement. These changes provide the executive with the time needed to actively pur-
sue innovation. 
Like the chief executive, the organization can expect some significant changes. Reward 
system modifications will be the most visible. Successful innovators will receive a wide 
range of prizes, from verbal recognition to career advancements. More importantly, the 
changing reward system signifies the beginning of a transition. Adjusted priorities will 
now reflect a new emphasis on innovation. Along with the emphasis will come future 
managers from the corps of innovators. Their advancement will bring a new mentality to 
the areas previously lacking concern for innovation. A passive attitude of accepting 
innovation will not be enough. Organizational requirements will mandate a continuing 
18 






















Figure 3: Modified Chief Executive Action Model 
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flow of innovative activity. The new manager will expect the same actions from peers 
and subordinates. Changing attitudes will eventually result in an environment which is 
prepared to change when warranted. Flexibility and readiness to accept new ideas will 
become corporate trademarks. 
Summary 
There are numerous benefits to be achieved by encouraging innovation. Improved 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness are two of the by-products. They can occur 
when technology is utilized in an area other than the one for which it was originally 
designed. 
Unfortunately, innovation is faced with many negative factors in the standard corpor-
ate environment. Incentives that discourage innovation, barriers which impede its prog-
ress, and reward systems which do not recognize its existence, are prime examples. They 
discourage individuals from becoming involved in innovative activity. In the above scen-
ario, the risks and responsibilities of failure force innovation into dormancy. Consequently, 
many opportunities for improvement are lost or never recognized. 
Changing the corporate environment requires management action which will occur 
only when innovation can successfully compete with other corporate needs. Management, 
like the rest of the organization, has few positive incentives to stimulate the needed 
changes. The average manager becomes enmeshed in his daily activities and unconsciously 
blocks out innovation. 
A proposed solution to the dilemma is to build an organizational mechanism that will 
provide the stimulus necessary to effect organizational changes. The mechanism does not 
make the modifications directly, but creates the pressure needed to get management 
attention and action. Resulting changes should establish and emphasize positive incen-
tives and suppress or eliminate organizational barriers to the innovative process. 
The mechanism is built around a special interest group. The group's concern for 
innovation provides tile foundation for building a collective body. By protecting and 
nurturing the nucleus, it can eventually grow into a vehicle which will compete for the 
organizational resources needed to develop an innovative environment. 
The group's success will be reflected first in a modified reward system. Various 
compensations will be established for successful innovators. As the rewards increase, the 
environment will begin to improve markedly. Eventually, vacant management positions 
will be filled by innovators. Their advancement signifies a change in how the organization 
views innovation. Innovation will -now become a requirement rather than a tolerated 
practice. 
The prescribed mechanism is only one approach. Similar mechanisms can be designed 
to achieve desired objectives. Careful evaluation of a specific organization may reveal a 
more effective means. The objective is to build a mechanism which can survive and com-
pete in the organizational environment. This implies that it must become institutionalized 
and, therefore, should include three important elements: 
1. Pressure comes from the bottom; therefore, the mechanism must include individuals 
from lower levels in the organization. 
2. The mechanism must have sufficient energy to compete with existing and future 
organizational needs. 
3. The mechanism must be designed for longevity. It must not be dependent on 
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Since 1969, the Navy has been sponsoring technology transfer methodology and 
effectiveness measurement studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
This paper outlines some of the significant findings as the result of this effort and the 
attempts of one Navy organization to put some of this knowledge into use. These tech-
nology transfer studies and reports have been grouped into two broad categories: 
(a) Methodology Research which concerns the mechanisms which cause technol-
ogy to transfer and the theory associated with the transfer, and 




In order to have a reference point to address these methodology studies, we need to 
briefly review one of the early milestone efforts developed by the Naval Postgraduate 
School, the Predictive Model of Technology Transfer shown in Figure 1. This model 
essentially tells us that all of these factors affect the transfer mechanism. The model can 
serve as an R&D manager's check list for technology transfer. It exposes deficiencies in 
acceptance of new technology and also provides a basis for quantitative measures of 
effectiveness so that management actions can be based on fact and not intuition. A 
brief explanation of each of the model's elements follows: 
Documentation refers to the format, organization, presentation, and language 
of the material transferred. For instance, is a laboratory technical report written 
so that only other laboratory people can understand it or so that the engineer in 
the field can understand it? 
Organization is an important factor in the flow of technology. The power 
structure, nature of the business, management philosophy, resources, attitudes, 
bureaucratic tendencies, and state of equilibrium all influence the impact of the 
organization on technology flow. 
Project Selection concerns who initiates the project, who approves, who author-
izes, who monitors, and who is consulted about the project. Users tend to utilize 
that which they help to develop. 
Capacity refers to characteristics of individuals. Such factors as venturesomeness, 
wealth, power, education, experience, age, and self-confidence influence the trans-
fer of technology; however, they are difficult to quantify. 
The linker is the individual who links the source and user organizations and is 
probably one of the most important factors in the transfer of technology. The 
linker can be associated with the source organization, the user organization or 
somewhere in between the two organizations. 
Credibility of the source is an obvious factor in the acceptance of information. If 
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the user perceives the message as believable and reliable, he is more likely to 
utilize it. In any interaction, information tends to flow most freely between 
people who have credibility in each other. 
Reward or penalty for the consequence of adopting new technology is an 
important factor in its acceptance. If a person is penalized for being innova-
tive, he is less likely to do it again. 
Willingness is simply the ability or agreement to help or be helped. 
FORMAL FACTORS 
Method of Information 
Documentation 
The Distribution System 
Formal Organization of the 
User 
Selection Process for Projects 
(Users' Contribution) 
INFORMAL FACTORS 
Capacity of the Receiver 
Informal Linkers in the 
Receiving Organization 
Credibility as Viewed by 
the Receiver 
Perceived Reward to the 
Receiver 
Willingness to be helped 











Using this framework, findings associated with each of the elements in the model are 
presented. It should be noted that while many of the conclusions discussed apply to spe-
cific Navy organizations and problems, it is not hard to hypothesize that these same con-
clusions could apply to many other federal and private organizations. Also, it is apparent 
that in some of the areas there is still much to be learned. 
Part III of this report begins with an index to researchers who have contributed 
followed by an identifying number. The number identifies the effort of each researcher. 
The number is associated with a title, a citation and a short abstract which follow the 
index in numeric order. Reference to each author's paper is by number only in the 
remainder of the report. 
The first group of studies in 1969 and 1970 addressed three elements of the model -
DOCUMENTATION, DISTRIBUTION, and CREDIBILITY. These studies indicated that 
our technical reports were difficult to use and our distribution procedures needed improve-
ment. Often reports were getting to the wrong people in the organization. Also, the 
studies indicated that personal contacts between the laboratory engineers and the users 
contribute more toward getting research results into use than does the actual reporti. 
With regard to DISTRIBUTION, the studies have indicated several effective and inef-
fective means. 
EFFECTIVE 
* One-to-one/small group discussions within laboratorie5 .6 
* Symposia.22 
* Directories of people interested in technology transfer (which enhances tech-
nology transfer).24 •31 
INEFFECTIVE 
* Reports, formal meetings within laboratories. 6 
* Information systems which ignore behavioral issues. 2 7 
A number of conclusions were drawn on studies of a specific ORGANIZATION: 
• Quantification of immeasurable benefits to measure organizational effective-
ness.12 
• Specifications may act as a barrier to utilization of new technology.15 
• Selection of suitable organization based on technical capability/expertise neces-
~ry for adequate test and evaluation. Past experience and associations are domi-
nant factors in selection process. 16 







• Dynamic environment outweighs usual factors in executive advancement. 30 
Only two studies have direct application to the PROJECT SELECTION element of the 
model: 
• No common R&D allocation procedures exist among industries/companies. 21 
• Technique of program goals and measurable indicators aid Navy exploratory 
development program. 29 
Considerable effort has been devoted to the LINKER element of the model because it 
focuses most directly on people. The literature tends to support the view that the human 
factor is the most important element in the transfer process: 
* Linker Characteristics2 
innovative 
more information contacts 
accepts risks 
high credibility 
interjects user needs into project selection 
adapts output into useful products 
* Linker-Stabilizer Behavior Not Unique to Select Population. The following 
percentages of linkers were found in separate organizations: 
Naval Civil Engineer Officers (3.6%)3 
Nav_al Civil Engineering Command Civilians (4.3%) 4 
Chief Radiomen (3.8%)13 
* Positive Correlation Between "Innovators" and "Linkers" 
(but not 1 for 1)2 5 
* Linkers Valuable to User Organization33 
Although there has not been much effort on REWARD, it is believed that lack of 
proper reward or the consequences of failure may be a primary factor constraining user 
acceptance of new technology. The following studies pertain to reward: 
• Vital factor in idea flow. 18 
• Financial compensation and family separation degrade retention of Navy 
officers. 2 8 
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Willingness to be 
Helped or to Help WILL 
28 
Evaluation of the NCEL Technical 
Report System, Elster, 1969 
Technology Transfer Model Utilizing th 2 Linker Concept: A Status Report, 
Creighton/Jolly/Denning, 1971 
Enhancement of Research and Develop-
ment Output Utilization Efficiencies; 3 
Linker Concept, Creighton/Jolly/ 
Dennin 1972 
Technology Transfer as Applied to 
4 Government Service Employees; A 
Comparison, Classen, 1973 
Technology Transfer and Utilization; 
Further Analysis of the Linker Concept, 7 
Jolly/Creighton, 1974 
Technology Transfer as Applied to 
Chief Radiomen; A Comparison, Fontz/ 13 
Shoemaker, 1975 
The Roles and Identification of Innova-
tors and Linkers in the Technology 2 5 
Transfer Process, Hochberger/Woolley, 
1977 
A Study of Nuclear Submarine Officer 28 
Retention Factors, Powers, 1977 
The Linkers Contribution to Technology 33 
Transfer, George/Jolly /Creighton, 197 8 
29 
A Study of the Presidential Internships 
in Science and Engineering, Carter/ 6 
Korsmo 1974 
Effectiveness of Symposia in Transfer-
ring Technical Information to Applied 2 2 
End Use, Bennett/Sweeney/Thornton, 
An Automated Information System for 
Persons Interested in Technology Trans- 24 
er Steidle/Green 1977 
Technological Developments in Infor- 27 mation Processing and the Resultant 
Impact on Users, Bannar, 1977 
Development of a Automated Procedure 
to Produce a Technology Transfer Direc- 31 
tor, Modrowski/Henderson, 197 8 
FIGURE 2. SPATIAL DIAGRAM OF 
RESEARCH EFFORT 
The studies shown have been directed at 
an effort to understand better the mech-
anism that causes effective technology 
transfer. A complete citation and com· 
prehensive annotation will be found in 
Part II of this paper. 
From this body of studies and reports, several general conclusions or themes relating 
to the transfer process are offered for consideration: 
• Informal communication often works better than formal, but each contributes 
• Personal contacts enhance the transfer process 
• Linkers valuable to organization 
• Dynamic environment supporting all factors outweighs any single element of 
transfer process 
In summarizing the methodology research studies, an attempt has been made to deter-
mine what management actions have been taken in relation to these studies. NA VF AC is 
probably more in a position of having the studies confirm previous or current manage-
ment direction rather than having taken action directly as a result of a study or report. It 
should be noted, however, that this effort provides an important information base on 
which to base future management decisions. This is very important in a military organiza. 
tion where R&D managers rotate every several years. Using the technology transfer 
model as a manager's check-off list, management actions relating to each element of the 
model follow: 
Element Applies To No.Studies NAVFAC Management Studies 
Linkers Supplier /User 7 R&D liaison representatives in 
field divisions (1966) Field Eng· 
ineering support office at CEL 
(1971) 
Distribution Supplier 6 Several distribution list improve-
ments since 1970 
Organization User 5 Liaison representatives and 
FESO office 
Project Selection Supplier 2 Formal task proposals (1966) 
Informal user participation (1976) 
(1) program documents 
(2) program reviews at CEL 
(3) workshops 
Reward User 2 Analysis of barriers, potential 
enhancement 
Documentation Supplier 1 RAP briefs and tech data sheets 
(1973), tech memorandum, pie· 
torial brochures (1975) 
Credibility Supplier/User 1 Continual management concern 
Capacity User 0 
Willingness User 0 
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It is important to note that only four or five elements of this model are primarily impact-
ed by the suppliers of technology. The other elements are the responsibility of the users. 
A principal purpose of this paper was to call attention to some of the research on the 
utilization of research that has been sponsored by the U. S. Navy. In order to present the 
interrelationships of the research effort and to depict the magnitude and concentration, 
papers, studies, and theses dealing with the research on utilization have been organized on 
a spatial diagram. In this diagram, Figure 2, the focus is on the PREDICTIVE MODEL 
OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER which appears on the left side. Each paper, study and/ 
or thesis is then related to an element of the model by means of a connecting line. 
One of the prime motivations for the development of the spatial diagram of research 
effort was to determine the degree and extent of research related to each element of the 
model. As can be clearly seen by a study of Figure 2, the distribution of research effort 
has not been uniform. Such is often the case when a work plan is a simple random func-
tion driven by interest and/or timely need. In retrospect, it should be noted that the 
spatial diagram of research is a chart covering a period of twelve years of research effort. 
It encompasses thirty-two papers, studies and/or theses. These efforts have made a sub-
stantial contribution to a better understanding of the technology transfer process. 
MEASUREMENT OF UTILIZATION 
Part II 
The worth of a management system or management technique should be determined 
by using a quantitative evaluation. Longitudinal evaluation is the premise of management 
control. It follows, then, that it is necessary and desirable to consider various evaluation 
procedures in order to determine the value of a specific technology transfer program and 
in order to project the benefit that may be expected from similar efforts. 
The Naval Postgraduate School, with the cooperation and support of other Naval 
activities, has directed several studies on the measurement of utilization or effectiveness 
of programs that were intended to enhance the utilization of research output. In the 
spatial diagram concerning the measurement of utilization or effectiveness, Figure 3, 
twenty-two studies look at three independent and quite different aspects of technology 
transfer. 
The first group of studies concern the effectiveness of a Field Engineering &lpport 
Office (FESO) which was established to link the Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs) of 
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to their central research facility (the Navy's 
Civil Engineering Laboratory at Port Hueneme, California). Results of the studies indica-
ted: 
* Positive feedback from users5 
* More utilization of information transferred and substantial dollar -savings8 
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* Quantification of benefits from information transferred to users; dollar savings11 
* How to computerize information processing of a small service organization19 
* How to use sampling procedures and user evaluations to measure the benefits 
and substantial dollar savings2 3 
The second group of studies are related to laboratory project utilization. In general, 
these studies measure the short term use of research output. Although it is recognized 
that a substantial amount of research output should be directed toward future issues, it 
was rewarding to find that a substantial percentage of the work performed by the Navy's 
Civil Engineering Laboratory found immediate use in mission-oriented applications. In 
particular: 
* Case study of Navy R&D project ($10,000) transferred to industry (1975 
market = $1,600,000) 14 
* A random sample of R&D projects showed 60% transitioned into use and that 
the likelihood of transition was related to transfer eff arts. 26 
* Actual user verification of the above study showed 43% transitioned into use. 32 
The third category identified on Figure 3 relates to organizational performance. A 
fundamental premise of management theory is that organizations have measurable behav-
ioral characteristics. Further, it is hypothesized that the organizational behavioral charac-
teristics will provide an environment that may be favorable or unfavorable for the comple-
tion of an identified mission. The work reported in this category investigated the organi-
zational environment in terms of technology transfer and research utilization and found: 
* How to measure high/low technology transfer performance and that it may actual-







FIELD ENGINEERING SUPPORT FESO Project Effectiveness Profile 8 OFFICE ,_ Jolly/Creighton, 1974 
I 
Benefit Analysis Model 11 Hendrickson/Fisher, 1974 
I 
Automated Assistance Program Data Base 19 
Suess/Thaler, 1976 
I 
Improvement on Benefit Analysis Model 23 Early, 1977 
NAVY'S CIVIL Case Study: Power Line Disturbance 14 ENGINEERING LABORATORY - Monitor, Tempest/Van Rooy, 1975 
I 
Exploratory Development Research 26 Effectiveness, Jolly /Creigh ton/Buckles, 
1977 
I 
Exploratory Development Research 32 Effectiveness: A Second Study, Buckles/ 
Jolly /Creighton, 1978 
ORGANIZATION STUDIES Turn-Key Construction in the Navy, 10 I ,..___ Ster, 1974 
I 
A Study of the Technology Transfer 17 Capability of Eleven Organizations, 
' 
Jolly, 1975 
FIGURE 3. MEASUREMENT OF UTILIZATION OR EFFECTIVENESS 
Grouped above are several studies of the measurement of utilization or 
effectiveness. For clarity, the studies are clustered and associated with 
specific organizational activities. A complete citation and a comprehen· 
sive annotation will be found in Part III of this paper. 
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CITATIONS AND ANNOTATIONS 
Part Ill 
Part III of this paper consists of citations and annotations of all of the papers that 
appear in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The papers are arranged in alphabetical order by author's 
last name. Each paper is identified by a complete citation. The citation is then followed 
by a comprehensive annotation (abstract). The citations and annotations are provided so 
that it will be possible to identify specific research studies that may be of interest for 
reference or further study. In most cases, single copies of the paper, report, or thesis are 
available by contacting Code 54Cf, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California · 
93940. 
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STUDIES WITH SUPPORTING DESCRIPTIVE ANNOTATIONS 
1. Elster, Richard S., Evaluation of the NCEL Technical Report System, NPS, 
Monterey, CA, 1969. 
2. Creighton, J. W., J. A. Jolly, and S. A. Denning, A Technology Transfer Model 
Utilizing the Linker Concept: A Status Report, NPS, Monterey, CA, December 
1971. 
The linker model as described in this paper analyzes the two-way channel of 
communication that has been found to be so important in the transfer of tech-
nology. It is centralized on the linker and his abilities and perceptions of his 
role of performing the linking process between the source of knowledge and 
utilization by the user. The linker's function is to inject the user's needs into the 
selection system of projects by the source and to transform the results of those 
projects into useful information to the user. To perform this function, the 
linker must possess certain characteristics relating to personal and interpersonal 
relationships. 
3. Creighton, J. W., J. A. Jolly, and S. A. Denning, Enhancement of Research and 
Development Output Utilization Efficiencies: Linker Concept Methodology in 
the Technology Transfer Process, NPS, Monterey, CA, June 1972. 
It was hypothesized that there is a relationship between the output efficiency 
utilization of research and development and the behavioral characteristics of the 
individuals in the user organization. Concepts and models are discussed leading to 
this hypothesis. A linker-type of performance is defined and a methodology for 
identifying such an individual is formed into a m~asuring instrument. Results 
from using the instrument in a census situation are presented. The instrument 
discrimination is subjected to validity tests and the results are reported. 
4. Claassen, Steven H., Technology Transfer as Applied to Government Service 
Employees of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and Compared to Naval 
Officers of the Civil Engineering Corps, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, September 
1973. 
It is hypothesized that there is a relationship between the efficient utilization of 
research and development and the behavioral characteristics of individuals in an 
organization which uses the research. A modified version of a previously develop-
ed psychological test for Naval Officers is used to determine the natural ability of 
Government Service Employees of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to 
transfer technical information and bring about its adoption. Emphasis is placed 
on locating and understanding these individuals to improve the efficiency of 
technology transfer. A comparison is made between the Government Service 
Employees queried and the previously tested Naval Officers. 
5. Jolly, J.A., and J. W. Creighton, FESO Project Effectiveness Profile: Summary 
and Analysis of 1972 Questionnaire Results, NPS, Monterey, CA, October 1973. 
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6. Cater, Charles E., and Thomas B. Korsmo, A Study of the Presidential Intern-
ships in Science and Engineering, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, June 1974. 
A survey of scientists and engineers who participated in the Presidential Intern-
ships in Science and Engineering Program was conducted by a questionnaire to 
determine the effectiveness of the program in meeting its objectives and to identi-
fy some of the characteristics of the interns. 
Results showed that most interns perceived the program to have helped them 
obtain employment in their respective fields. A majority of the laboratories did 
not utilize this program to obtain special skills or normally unobtainable talent. 
No correlation was found between the interns and any innovator characteristics. 
The report summarizes responses to each question and recommends the direction 
of future research. 
7. Jolly, J. A., and J. W. Creighton, Technology Transfer and Utilization Methodol-
ogy: Further Analysis of the Linker Concept, NPS, Monterey, CA, June 1974. 
The concept that a model of the methodology of technology transfer and utiliza-
tion has two major subdivisions, formal vs. informal communications, is discussed 
briefly. Some literature support for the informal communications aspect of the 
model of the methodology of technology transfer and utilization are presented. 
An in-depth analysis is made of one of the informal elements of the model, 
"linker-stabilizer behavior". The analysis is based on two studies of technically 
trained personnel; one, Naval Officers and the second, Government Service 
Employees. The thrust of the analysis and the conclusion seem to indicate 
strongly that the commonality of the technical training is more dominant than the 
decision to be a Naval Officer or a Government Service Employee. This conclu-
sion thus supports the belief that the distribution of linker-stabilizer behavior 
characteristics has a general base in terms of technically trained personnel and is 
not unique to a select population. 
8. Jolly, J. A., and J. W. Creighton, FESO Project Effectiveness Profile: Preliminary 
Analysis of 1973 Questionnaire Results, NPS, Monterey, CA, August 1974. 
This analysis is a one-year follow up of the 1972 FESO Project Effectiveness 
Profile. This is a preliminary report because two NPS students are presently 
working on a more detailed study of the 1972 and 1973 data. The analysis 
shows that there is strong evidence that the FESO office has improved in effec-
tiveness. This is reflected by a larger number of requests for assistance, more 
utilization of the assistance upon receipt, and an impressive dollar value savings. 
9. Jolly, J. A., The Technology Transfer Process: Concepts, Framework, and Method-
ology, NPS, Monterey, CA, November 1974. 
The concepts, framework, and methodology of the technology transfer process 
are discussed. On the basis of research, a model of the transfer mechanism is 
developed. This model is carried through several iterations to arrive at a predic-
tive model of technology transfer. The model is useful in terms of exposing 
deficiencies in the acceptance of new and/or innovative technology. In addition, 
the model has a future usefulness in terms of providing a basis for a quantitative 
measure of the effectiveness of an organization to capitalize on the technc..: '.)gy 
transfer process. 
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Ster, John W, The Concept and Application of Turnkey Construction Contrac· 
ting in the Navy, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, December 1974. 
Increasing construction costs for military construction and family housing projects 
are severely testing the conventional method of contracting. The turnkey con· 
tractual method of design-build has been previously used in the process industries 
and most recently for DOD family housing construction. 
This thesis reviews the construction procurement interrelationships including the 
architect-engineer, constructor, and the contractual documents. The turnkey con-
cepts as used by the private and public sectors is explored, the military services 
approach is reviewed, and the turnkey concept evaluated. Trends in the contrac-
tual methods of the private and public sector are discussed and the turnkey 
method is presented as a concept that has not been fully evaluated nor previously 
permitted to be used extensively within the Department of Defense beyond the 
limits of family housing construction. 
Hendrickson, Jack E., and WilJiam Fisher, Jr., An Evaluation of the Effectiveness 
of a Research Organization's Mechanism for Transferring Technical Information 
to Applied End Use, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, December 1974. 
An organizational mechanism instituted at a research/development center to facili-
tate the transfer of technological information to field operating units is analyzed 
in an attempt to measure its effectiveness. The evaluation is based on a model 
derived to quantify the benefits of the information transferred to end users. In 
addition, other organizational parameters of the users and suppliers of informa-
tion is evaluated to determine an optimal configuration to maximize the effective-
ness of the transfer mechanism. 
12. Jolly, J.A., and J. W. Creighton, Technology Transfer and Utilization: A Longi-
tudinal Study Using Benefit Analysis to Measure the Results from an R&D Labor-
atory, NPS, Monterey, CA, March 1975. 
A description is given of a program designed to improve technology transfer and 
utilization in a classical organization consisting of a research and development 
activity and several engineering-oriented user activities. The effectiveness of the 
technology transfer and utilization program is longitudinally studied. Three-year 
comparisons of several parameters are reported. A benefit evaluation decision 
model is introduced in order to improve the accuracy of the cost/benefit evalua-
tion of the technology transfer and utilization program. Using this model further, 
longitudinal comparisons are made. Finally, the general usefulness of the benefit 
evaluation decision model is argued by showing that for each dollar of investment 
this particular program gave a present value return of $2.72 in benefit. Several 
additional comparisons that could be made are suggested. 
13. Fontz, Charles R., and Michael P. Shoemaker, Technology Transfer as Applied to 
Chief Radiomen in the U S. Navy and Compared to Naval Officers of the Civil 
Engineering Corps, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, March 1975. 
The main emphasis of this study was a comparison of the results of the survey 
administered to the Chief Radiomen of the U. S Navy to the results of the study 
given to the Civil Engineering Corps Officers. It was hypothesized that in terms 
of technology transfer, in general, Chief Radiomen are no different from any 
other general population. 
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14. Tempest, Edward H, and Lester A. Van Rooy, Jr., The Power Line Disturbance 
Monitor: A Case Study of the Navy's Continuing Efforts in the Field of Tech-
nology Transfer, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, March 1975. 
This paper presents a case study of the successful attempt of a Navy research 
laboratory to participate in technology transfer. Background information con-
cerning the Defense Department's research and development budget along with 
Defense and Navy policy regarding technology transfer is provided The aggres-
sive technology transfer program devised and implemented by the Navy's Civil 
Engineering Laboratory is discussed. The development of a power line disturb-
ance monitor and its inclusion into the laboratory's technology transfer program 
are traced. An assessment of the benefits that accrued to both the public and 
private sectors of the economy, as a result of this particular project, is made. 
15. Parrish, Richard D., and Douglas G. Knappe, Specifications as a Barrier to the 
Transfer and Utilization of New Technology into Navy Construction: A critical 
Review, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, March 1975. 
The possibility that the system of specifications presently followed by Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) acts as a significant barrier to the 
transfer and utilization of new technology into Navy construction is analyzed. 
Specific areas are investigated using personal interviews and emphasis is placed on 
identifying and understanding the barriers and to improve the efficiency of 
technology transfer within the Navy. 
16. Aanerud, Kenneth D., John R Kane, and Michael B. Kelley, Project Manager and 
Test and Evaluation Facility Relationship, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, September 
1975. 
This thesis investigates the relationship between Washington-based Project Manag-
ers and a Test and Evaluation (T&E) facility, the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC). 
First, the formal weapon system acquisition process as prescribed by current direc-
tives is presented as an overview. Next, the Pacific Missile Test Center organiza-
tion is analyzed This is followed by an investigation of funding techniques, and 
specifically, those employed by PMTC. The Project Managers' perception of their 
participation in the T&E process is presented through results of a questionnaire. 
Finally, an objective method of selecting the appropriate T&E facility for a project 
based on technical capability is developed. 
17. Jolly, J. A., A Study of the Technology Transfer Capability of Eleven Organiza-
tions, NPS, Monterey, CA, 1975. 
This study takes the factors of the Technology Transfer Model and develops an 
instrument which attempts to measure each of the factors. In administering the 
instrument to eleven organizations, the data analysis showed that there were sig-
nificant differences between some of the factors. Some organizations have sever-
al factors that are positive and significant while others have several factors that are 
negative and significant. It is suggested that using the described technique may be 
possible to identify organizations that are high performers in terms of technology 
transfer and those which are low performers. 
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18. Nyenhuis, Keith E., and James H. Welborn, Analysis of the Perceived Reward to 
the Receiver and Its Impact on the Predictive Model of Technology Transfer, 
Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, June 1976. 
It was hypothesized that rewards, as perceived by an individual in an organization, 
are important in that perceived reward forms one identifiable factor in attempting 
to predict the rate of movement of ideas within an organization. Various concepts 
and models are discussed relating to this hypothesis. The methodology to deter-
mine the influence of the perceived reward and its subsequent impact on the flow 
of ideas within an organization was formed into a measuring instrument. The 
results from the situational interviewing instrument are presented and conclusions 
support the hypothesis that perceived reward is a vital factor in predicting idea 
flow. 
19. Suess, Kenneth M., and James F. Thaler, Demonstration of the Feasibility of 
Automating the Information System of a Small Service Organization Using a 
Generalized Computer Software Package, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, September 
1976. 
The concept of using a generalized computer software package to satisfy the 
information processing requirements of a small service organization was introduc-
ed. The feasibility of this approach was demonstrated by applying the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to the data processing requirements of a 
service organization. Using SPSS, an automated information system was develop-
ed and implemented in an operational environment for the Facility Engineering 
Support Office (FESO), a service organization at the Civil Engineering Laboratory 
(CEL). 
The utilization of the SPSS at FESO conclusively demonstrated that a generalized 
computer software package is a cost effective approach to satisfying the informa-
tion processing requirements of a small service organization. The development 
process and operating procedures were documented to facilitate the adoption of 
this approach by other service organizations. 
20. Grubber, Jack A, Utilization of Technology Transfer Concepts as an Aid for 
Engineering Management in a Test and Evaluation Organization, Thesis, NPS, 
Monterey, CA, September 1976. 
This thesis addresses Technology Transfer as it might be applied in a Test and 
Evaluation (T&E) activity for weapons systems and components within the 
Federal Government. Factors associated with the Technology Transfer process, 
aids and barriers to Technology Transfer, the innovative and creative processes, 
and managerial requirements for Technology Transfer are related to the job of an 
engineering manager in a T&E organization. From the relationships, a Paradigm 
for action for middle management engineers to improve technical capability by 
utilizing Technology Transfer concepts is formulated. 
21 Fish, Howard C., and Joseph W. Wilson, A Survey of Industrial Research and 
Development Budgeting, Effort Selection, and Evaluation, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, 
CA, September 1976. 
A study was made of procedures used by industry for allocating research and 
development investments. Areas of inquiry included levels and trends of R&D 
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effort criteria upon which to base budget decisions, personnel selection criteria, 
apportionment between basic and applied research and development, lead time to 
results, extension funding criteria, and worth evaluation. 
Results show a wide range of criteria in use, with principal differences between 
industries and between companies of different sizes. 
Recommendations are made for use of the study results and for further study 
and eventual development of a comprehensive decision model. 
22. Bennett, Donald R., John L. Sweeney, and Kenneth L. Thorton, A Study of the 
Effectiveness of Symposia for Transferring Technical Information to Applied 
End Use, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, September 1976. 
A program is designed for the transfer of technology from the Navy's research 
effort to other potential users. This program uses the technical symposium as the 
basic mechanism for transfer, drawing on the technological resources of research 
organizations, and the perceived needs of the user community. It is designed to 
communicate technological information, to develop a mutual appreciation of each 
other's problems and to establish communications among all participants in the 
technology utilization process. 
A plan is developed for a technology transfer symposium in the field of Communi· 
cations Electronics based on promising research efforts in this field performed at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This symposium is proposed as the proto· 
type vehicle for the Navy's Technology Transfer Symposium Program. 
Lastly, a technique is developed for measuring the effectiveness of the symposium 
program, utilizing feedback from preceding symposia, so that the format of similar 
future programs might be optimized. 
23. Early, Eugene Ii, The Measurement of Efforts to Enhance the Effectiveness of 
NA VFAC RDT&E Investments, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, June 1977. 
The concept of using sampling procedures and user evaluations to measure the 
effectiveness of a small service program was introduced. Evaluations were based 
on the benefit of information transferred to end users. The feasibility of this 
approach was demonstrated using the evaluated benefit of randomly selected 
service requests as a basis for estimating the total benefit and return on investment 
(ROI) for the Assistance Program during the fourth quarter of FY-1976. 
The concept of using subjective evaluations to measure effectiveness in a more 
timely manner was also introduced and demonstrated to be a useful approach to 
estimate ROI with reasonable accuracy. 
An automated information system using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences was also expanded in an operational environment to accommodate the 
data processing requirements of an effectiveness measuring system for the Facili· 







Steidle, Robert E., and William T. Green, The Development of an Automated 
Information System to Provide a Source of Communication Document for Persons 
Interested in Technology Transfer, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, June 1977. 
A directory of people who are knowledgeable in technology and who are willing 
and able to transmit it is provided. This work screens and expands on a 1975 list 
with a similar objective. It evaluates the effectiveness of the 1975 directory. It 
provides the methodology for cataloging new informational sources so that the 
directory may be routinely up-dated. 
Hochberger, Lyle K., and Bill G. Woolley, The Roles and Identification of Innova-
tors and Linkers in the Technology Transfer Process, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, 
September 1977. 
The concept that the innovator is a unique and essential element in the process of 
technology transfer is advanced. Distinction is drawn between the innovator, the 
inventor, and the linker categories of individuals. An instrument is developed to 
identify both the innovator and the linker. The instrument is administered to a 
set of individuals and the ability of the instrument to differentiate is validated 
through the results of a series of interviews with a sample of the respondents. 
Extensive analysis is performed on the results of both the questionnaire and the 
personal interviews. Conclusions are drawn, and the recommendations for addi-
tional investigation are provided. 
Jolly, J. A., J. W. Creighton, and T. A Buckles,Exploratory Development Research 
Effectiveness, CSUS/NPS, September 1977. 
A study was conducted to determine the transition (utilization) of the output of 
one category of exploratory development research sponsored by the NA VF AC-
ENGCOM Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia. A detailed investigation was made 
about the transition of thirty work units (projects) that were selected, using a 
stratified random sample, from work units that had been completed during the 
period FY-72 to and including FY-76. The exploratory development research 
work units investigated in this study were completed at the Navy's Civil Engineer-
ing Laboratory at Port Hueneme, California. 
The data from the study showed that the output of sixty percent of the work 
units had been transitioned. Some transitioned work units provided a product, 
some provided a service, and yet others were the basis for further research effort. 
Several factors that could be important in causing successful transition were 
investigated. The factor exerting the most influence on the transition of the 
output of a work unit (project) was the amount of technology transfer effort. It 
was shown statistically that the likelihood of project transition was directly 
related to the degree of effort directed to technical reports, technical memoranda, 
technical data sheets and other forms of technical information dissemination, and 
by the technical specialization. In contrast, it was found that the likelihood of 
transition of a work unit (project) was not significantly influenced by the years 
since the work unit was completed, work unit cost, or duration of the research 
effort on a specific work unit. 
Crosstabulations of these data are included in the report. The work units studied 
and related pertinent data are listed in the appendix. 
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27. Bannar, Charles J., Jr., Technological Developments in Information Processing 
and the Resultant Impact on User Organizations, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, 
September 1977. 
This thesis has a basic hypothesis that previous failures of information systems in 
organizations are directly related to the disproportionately high amount of 
emphasis given to the technical aspects of data processing as compared to the 
inadequate attention and concern devoted by management, computer specialists, 
and users of information systems to critical behavioral issues. The behavioral 
issues presented are subunit conflicts, training, skills, and perceptions of the 
participants, information sharing, power, and organizational politics. After 
reviewing the underlying reasons behind the lack of success achieved in the past, 
the organizational impact of fourth generation distributive processing techniques 
is predicted. A conflict and power model is presented that addresses the key 
organizational variables that prohibit successful information systems' design and 
development. Recommendations regarding operation, design, and organizational 
activities are presented with the goal of improving ultimate user satisfaction of 
data processing services. 
28. Powers, Fredrick W., A Study of Nuclear Submarine Officer Retention Factors, 
Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, September 1977. 
This thesis presents the results of a study to determine the quantitative effect of 
various Congressional and Navy Department actions taken to improve the reten-
tion of nuclear-trained submarine officers. The time period of interest is from 
1967 to mid-1977. 
It is concluded that "total package" coordinated action by Congress and the Navy 
Department, involving both monetary and personnel assignment incentives, is 
necessary for solution of the nuclear submarine officer retention problem. 
It is recommended that specific modification of the present submarine personnel 
assignment procedures be initiated to allow rotation of personnel throughout both 
the ballistic missile and fast attack segments of the nuclear submarine community. 
29. Potts, Dennis L., An Investigation of the Effectiveness, Selection, and Evaluation 
of Navy Exploratory Development Programs, Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, 
December 1977. 
An investigation is made of the Navy Exploratory Development Program; its newly 
revamped management system, its organization, and underlying rationale. The 
investigation then addresses the processes of program selection, review, and evalu-
ation as applied to technology-base programs, followed by an overview of a 
methodology called "Evaluation Research"as it applies to goal-oriented programs. 
The paper is directed toward determining the effectiveness of technology base 
programs, with a major emphasis on the changing structure of the Exploratory 
Development Program within the Department of Defense. 
30. Howe, David B., and Glenn ll Deacon, Enhancement of Executive Potential, 
Thesis, NPS, Monterey, CA, March 1978. 
This thesis contains an examination of previous works in the area of executive 







works. The authors' ideas as to how aspiring individuals can enhance their poten-
tial to reach executive stature follows. Whereas most previous works deal with 
only a few concepts of executive ascendancy, this work is presented with a view 
toward the overall concept as a multifaceted effort which must take place within 
a dynamic environment. 
Modrowski, Richard W., and Michael M. Henderson, The Development of a Fully 
Automated Procedure to Produce a Technology Transfer Directory of People to 
Facilitate the Linker Function in the Technology Transfer Process, Thesis, NPS, 
Monterey, CA, June 1978. 
The process of Technology Transfer is dependent on personal communication 
between individuals knowledgeable in new technology and who are willing to 
share this knowledge with others for the purpose of increasing the benefits to 
mankind. This work facilitates the communication process by developing a fully 
automated system to produce a directory listing of people who comprise this 
category. Furthermore, the system's computer programs constitute a model by 
which the process of gathering, storing, extracting, and displaying various types 
of information is made possible. 
Buckles, Thomas A., James A. Jolly, and J. W. Creighton, Exploratory Develop-
ment Research Effectiveness: A Second Evaluation, CSUS/NPS, September 1978. 
A second study was conducted to evaluate the transition (utilization) of the out-
put of one category of exploratory development research sponsored by the 
NAVFACENGCOM. A detailed investigation was made concerning the transition 
of thirty work units (projects) that had been the subject of a study conducted 
previously (Jolly, Creighton, Buckles, 1977). The second evaluation occurred 
at NA VF ACENGCOM Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia and involved each of 
the program managers located there. However, different procedures and sampling 
techniques were used in this study. It was determined that 43.33% of the work 
units had transitioned. Factors investigated concerning project transition at the 
Headquarters level were very similar to those studied at the Civil Engineering 
Laboratory in Port Hueneme, California. Statistically, successful project transi-
tion is contingent on technical expertise and professional communication channels. 
It was also found in this second study that the probablity of project transition is 
not significantly affected by the span of time that the project has been completed 
or by cost of the work unit. 
The work units studied and related pertinent data are listed in the appendix. 
George, Peter, James A. Jolly, and J. W. Creighton, "The Linkers Contribution 
to Technology Transfer," Journal of Technology Transfer, 3 (1), 1978. 
The role of an individual known as a "linker" is examined and the similarities 
between his role and those of "gatekeeper", "opinion leader", and "innovator" 
are discussed in detail. Not only are the similarities among these roles pointed out 
but also the unique characteristics of the "linker" are clarified. A Linker Model 
for Technology Transfer is presented showing the value of a linker to the parent 
and users organizations. Managerial endeavors to understand and promote tech-
nology transfer can be facilitated by the in-depth research presented. 
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Thank you for inviting me to take part in your symposium today. 
Technology Transfer is not new to the Forest Service or to the U. S. Department of 
Agriculture. The Forest Service is placing new emphasis on the importance of technology 
transfer and giving new recognition to the need for it in nearly every phase of our agency's 
work. 
What kinds of technology transfer is the Forest Service interested in? Many different 
kinds, including those dealing with the biological sciences, the physical sciences, and the 
social sciences, as you will understand when you look briefly at the broad· scope of our 
agency's work. 
The Forest Service, an agency of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, is dedicated to 
multiple-use management of the Nation's forest resources for sustained yields of water, 
forage, wildlife, wood, and recreation. Employees of the Forest Service, the largest and 
most diverse agency in the Department of Agriculture, handle practically every imagin-
able natural resource task, from improving the beauty of the forest to showing strip 
miners how to rehabilitate land to managing nearly 90 percent of the Nation's wilderness. 
Our activities cover three major areas, each with a separate mission: 
* One is the management, protection, and use of the 187 million acres of National 
Forest lands for a sustained flow of economic and social benefits. 
* The State and Private Forestry arm of the Forest Service administers a number 
of programs in cooperation with State Foresters, private forest and woodland 
owners, wood processors, private and public agencies in all fifty states, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Pacific Trust Territories. This coopera-
tion is designed to focus scientific management and utilization on forest resources 
and forest products to improve the quality and increase the quantity of goods 
and services produced from forest lands. 
* The Research mission of the Forest Service supports National Forest manage-
ment and the cooperative forestry programs, plus management of the Nation's 
forests and rangelands in general. The Research arm of the Forest Service also 
conducts a cooperative research program with forestry colleges and land grant 
universities with Agricultural Experiment Stations in most states. Incidentally, 
the Research arm of the Forest Service is the largest such organization in the 
world. 
This should give you a limited idea of why the Forest Service is vitally interested in a 
technology transfer program dealing with a broad range of subject matter, designed to 
reach a wide range of people, in a variety of ways. 
In the Forest Service, we consider technology transfer a total process, both internally 
and externally directed, and involving all of the following elements: 
- Identifying the technology available for transfer and needing transfer; 
- Identifying the target user audience to whom the technology or information is 
to be trans{ erred; 
- Developing an objective plan of application; 
- Packaging the knowledge or technology for easy understanding; 
















- Involving the scientist and/or specialists who developed the new technology 
with users, especially users who are innovators; 
- Troubleshooting and feedback; and 
- Evaluating the process and results. 
Historically, the rate of technology growth has tended to outdistance man's capability to 
implement this technology. The Forest Service is no exception to this problem. 
Recognizing the need to do a better job of transferring technology to users, we held 
our first National Technology Transfer Workshop in Atlanta six years ago. We can point 
to a number of notable achievements since then - some outstanding research develop-
ment and application projects; reorganization and staffing to better define key roles in 
the national headquarters and at field locations; some fine technology transfer periodi-
cals, and more. 
About two years ago, the Chief appointed a Technology Transfer Analysis Group 
(TTAG). The Group was composed of top management officers from each program area 
of the Forest Service to look at technology transfer in the Forest Service. This gave full 
recognition to the need for consideration of technology transfer at the top management 
level. Then last year, a Technology Transfer Staff Group was formed in the national 
headquarters, serving and responsive to all five Deputy Chiefs and their staffs. The mission 
of the technology transfer staff is to help Forest Service managers and cooperators ensure 
that the best forest and range technology is applied to improve management of the 
Nation's renewable resources in the broadest sense. They serve as catalysts. 
To assess our progress and make recommendations for the futur~, we held our second 
National Technology Transfer Workshop in Tucson last February. Drs. Creighton and 
Jolly played a significant role in the success of this workshop. Top level support was 
given to working groups as they sat down to identify problems and discuss possible 
solutions. Recommendations from this workshop are now being considered, and plans 
for implementation are under way. 
Recommendations for consideration from workshop participants included establish-
ing regional technology transfer groups to improve coordination at the field level. It was 
recommended that regional groups be responsible for coordinating action, planning, 
budgeting, training, development, and maintenance of regional technology transfer activ-
ities. It was further suggested that regional conferences for key Forest Service personnel 
and cooperators be held for training and planning purposes. We are considering a pilot 
test with a regional group to determine the validity of this approach and to provide guide-
lines for establishing other regional groups. 
We recognize that informational material will be called for if we are to do a good job 
in communicating with each other. The exact nature of that material is yet to be worked 
out. We are currently developing a guide for preparing a technology transfer plan. It will 
be designed to take a person with a technique or some scientific information intended for 
a user through a simple planning process for reaching that user, keeping in mind that 
technology transfer is the total process that I described earlier. Copies of the workshop 
highlights, which will be available about June 1, and the guide, which will be available 
later, may be obtained by contacting the Technology Transfer Group in the Washington 
Office of the Forest Service. 
To illustrate briefly what the guide will do for us, let us imagine that a Forest Service 
research project has some results useful to managers of both public and private lands. 
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Existence of the information will also be of interest to other groups, perhaps to the 
general public. 
The planning guide will ask the project leader or research scientist to spell out the 
messages to be transferred, thus identifying the technology available for transfer. Then 
he or she will be asked, "Who is your audience? Who can use it? Who cares? Does 
anyone care!!?" In other words, the target user groups will be named. 
The researcher will then need to list the specific objectives of getting this particular 
information into other hands. What do you hope to accomplish? A team should then be 
formed with members who can help do the job. This will include such people as service 
foresters, extension agents, information specialists, and others whose expertise will be 
useful. The team will be helpful in identifying the best media for reaching certain user 
groups (whether it should be a publication, a seminar, a slide-tape, a one-on-one assistance 
program), and will also be helpful in preparing material needed to do the job. 
I won't go into detail on the whole process, but perhaps this much will give you an 
idea of the step-by-step way that we hope our guide will make what can appear to be a 
complicated process into a workable plan. Incidentally, we have had several notable 
successes using this approach, so the ideas are not untested. Several examples will be 
included in the guide, and will serve to illustrate the importance of flexibility in using 
the plan. 
I wish to emphasize here that we certainly do not want to reinvent the wheel as we 
go forward with plans to extend our technology for managing forest resources to as 
many users as we can reach. USDA has been in this business for years. The State Agri-
culture Extension Services are doing a commendable job of reaching vast numbers of 
people who call on them for help, both urban and rural. I hope we can take full advan-
tage of their cooperation and good work and, in turn, can provide them with technical 
know-how useful to them. Some States have developed agreements between State 
Foresters and State Extension Services and Soil Conservation Districts, defining their 
respective roles and pledging joint effort in technology transfer. 
Our society is rapidly becoming an information society, with instant transmittal 
capability almost everywhere. The decade of the 70's has brought new mandates for pro-
tecting the environment, for long-range planning, for improved forest practices, and for 
greater emphasis on reducing the time lag in realizing the results of research. 
We have built some first-rate technological systems in the Forest Service, and our 
scientists have added a great deal to our understanding of the management and protec-
tion of forest resources. We have gained a better knowledge of ecological processes and 
of the inter-relationships among various resources. We are aware of large gaps in our 
application of new knowledge, and it is through bringing about a comprehensive technol-
ogy transfer process that we hope to fill in some of those gaps. 
It will be a constantly on-going job. Our Associate Chief defines technology transfer 
as "a continuous process with live circuits." How do we close the gaps in this circuit? 
How do we reduce resistance to technology transfer? 
In a three-mission organization such as ours, there are a great many advantages plus a 
few difficulties to overcome. Naturally, in a huge organization with widely diversified 
duties and objectives, we must always watch for better ways to cooperate and to coordi-
nate our activities, minimizing duplication, maximizing efficiency and usefulness. We 
must try especially hard for good internal communication. 
We recognize these needs, and believe we are taking steps in the right direction. 
Annually, we have been publishing a list of the preceding year's research accomplishment. 
We publish illustrated highlights, selected by the Research Stations across the country, 
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We are trying to present this material in a manner that will be readable and useful, both 
within the Forest Service and to practitioners outside the agency. 
Our 197 8 report is "hot off the press." Copies may be obtained from our Technology 
Transfer Group. It takes only a quick leafing through the highlight pages to confirm the 
broad range of Forest Service research needs and accomplishments. In recent years, we 
have been hearing more about the need for conserving forest resources. Meanwhile, the 
need for their use goes on. 
Much of the Nation's water supply flows from National Forest System lands. While 
National Forest System lands comprise less than one-twelfth of the country's total area, 
they contain about 50 percent of the Nation's big game. In Fiscal Year 1977, the Forest 
Service improved the wildlife and fish habitat on 1,017,273 acres of National Forest lands. 
Technology transfer was involved. 
Our national appetite for wood products has jumped 70 percent during the past thirty 
years, and the United States will face even greater demands for forest products by the 
year 2000. In order to boost the timber produced from National Forest lands, more 
intensive management practices are being applied. Technology transfer is needed to sup-
port this effort. 
Meeting our Nation's increased demands for recreational opportunities from a pleasing 
forest environment has imposed special problems on forest land managers. In 1977, there 
were 200 million visitor-days of recreational use of National Forests. This total is greater 
than any other Federally-administered land. The demand has nearly been insatiable. Again, 
technology transfer needed to keep up. 
The Forest Service pioneered establishment of wilderness in 1924 with the Nation's 
first such area - the Gila Wilderness in New Mexico. Now, increasing numbers of visitors 
are using some 14 million acres of designated wilderness included in 106 units within 
the National Forest System. 
All fifty States cooperate with the Forest Service in the Cooperative Forest Fire 
Control Program for protecting approximately 700 million acres of valuable wildlife. 
Each State is responsible for providing the needed organization, training, manpower, and 
equipment to protect the lands within its borders. The Forest Service provides technical 
and financial assistance. 
To further illustrate our agency's personnel diversity, the Forest Service has one of the 
World's largest engineering groups, and also employs the Nation's largest work force of 
landscape architects hired by a single U. S. agency or organization. We also employ some 
300 wildlife biologists, numerous hydrologists, archeologists, and soil scientists, just to 
mention a few of the many professions represented in our agency. Oh yes, and about 
5,000 foresters also. 
In summary, our plans for the future are based on full utilization of the established 
management processes within the Forest Service. No new major institution is needed. 
What we are doing that is new is trying to integrate technology transfer into our daily 
operations - so it becomes a part of the normal activity for our people. And, we will 
provide some aids to help with the job. 
In the final analysis, technology transfer will be accomplished through people. All 
the tools and aids will not do the job unless we have people who are motivated to do 
technology transfer. The job of the manager is no different in technology than in any-
thing else. He must work through people. He must motivate them to do the technology 
transfer job. He must convince his people that technology transfer is needed, is a worth-
while task, and it can be personally rewarding. 
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I'll bet that there are few present who haven't had a boost to the ego when another 
person - perhaps a member of your family or a friend - has asked "will you teach me 
how to do that'?" I submit that this is the essence of technology transfer. 
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Bruce Reiss heads the Local Government Program in the Office of Intergovernmental 
Science & Public Technology, National Science Foundation, with a prime responsibility 
toward insuring that the results from the nation's investment in science research are 
effectively utilized. He is active in integrating work between the Federal Laboratory Con-
sortium and various elements in the public sector. He has played a major role in establish-
ing networks of potential users of science and technology, particularly in the public 
sector. Mr. Reiss explains the innovation networks which have been developed as innova-
tive Federal thrust to further the effective and appropriate use of the nation's science 
resources. 
The National Science Foundation has been increasingly active in recent years in efforts 
to improve the usefulness of the nation's scientific effort. The Office of Intergovern-
mental Programs has a major responsibility in this area. 
Our general approach is one of responding to needs, by supporting the establishment 
and, in some cases, establishing networks of potential users of knowledge. We also 
encourage and sometimes coordinate the support activities behind the functioning of the 
networks. The networks systems will be described, the support organizations, and the 
general functioning of the entire system. 
Knowledge Utilization Networks 
There are several kinds of networks now operating. They have similar purposes and 
sometimes their activities intertwine, but their differences derive from differing needs 
and from organizational structure. 
The Innovation Groups 
We have established sub-regional networks and are trying to establish multi-state 
networks within the regions, one per federal region. These are called innovation groups. 
Within them, the cities and counties get together to identify problems, to screen sources 
of science and technology for solutions and to uncover successful applications. Innova-
groups have been established in most of the regions. Following is a listing: 
Federal Region I 
Federal Region II 
Federal Region III 
Federal Region IV 
NEIG New England Innovation Group 
NYIG New York Innovation Group 
MAIG Middle Atlantic Innovation Group 
SEIG Southeast Innovation Group with branches in: 
Florida 
Tennessee (operating out of the University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville) 
Alabama (operating out of Auburn University, Auburn 










































Federal Region V GLIG Great Lakes Innovation Group 
Federal Region VI CSIG Central States Innovation Group 
Federal Region VII RRIG Red River Innovation Group {made up of Texas & 
Oklahoma) 
Federal Region VIII RMIG Rocky Mountain Innovation Group {consisting of 
Colorado, Utah, and the Upper Plains States 
Federal Region IX SWIG Southwest Innovation Group 
Federal Region X PNIG Pacific Northwest Innovation Group 
The groups are quite heterogeneous in that there is no common structure outside of a 
central person who more or less ties things together in each region. The membership 
usually consists of interested people from various public sector organizations. And, a 
member of an innovation group might also be a representative in one of the other nation-
al networks. The knowledge resources are picked up wherever they can be found. Often, 
they consist of successful innovations which are known about by one and passed to 
others. Representatives from the different groups also meet, and tend to pass to others 
information about successes and failures. 
The groups were often made up originally as a regional group, for instance, the New 
England Group. On the other hand, the SEIG is somewhat of an amalgamation of sub-
groups from Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia. Similarly, GLIG is a field-in 
of the Indiana-Milwaukee, Wisconsin Project and Ohio's State Department of Community 
Development. 
The Central Region of the country, RMIG, looks like a cross-section of a big I beam. 
To ttie south, there is the Colorado Innovation Group, serving Colorado and Utah, and 
working out of the Urban Observatory in Denver. Farther north, the Upper Plains States 
Group, is formed to serve the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming. In the west, SWIG, the 
Southwest Innovation Group emerged out of the old California Innovation Group and 
covers California, Arizona, and Nevada. 
The above groups essentially serve local government in innovation matters. It is 
probable that as time goes by there will be different amalgamations, and separations as 
differing needs become apparent, and as differing work relationships emerge. 
Public Technology, Inc. 
Public Technology, Inc. {PTI) was established by various Public Interest Groups 
with help from the National Science Foundation Office of Intergovernmental Programs. 
PTI is the Secretariat for the following three national programs. 
Community Technology Innovative Program (CTIP) 
CTIP is a national network of thirty-two government jurisdictions of 50,000 
population or less. Its objectives are primarily to identify and prioritize innovations and 
solutions to identified problems for cities in the under 50,000 population range. It 
operates under the assumption that cities of this size have different problems and can 
assess different systems than those of larger communities. It so happens that the federal 
laboratories have served as the major resource for staffing this program. Dr. Ted Maher is 
Project Director of CTIP. 
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Urban Technology Systems (UTS) 
This system is a network of thirty-two government jurisdictions between 50,000 
and 500,000 population. In these cities, science advisors or technology agents were 
placed in city halls, working for the city managers, as bureaucratic innovators or facilita-
tors. Don Spicer of Public Technology, Incorporated is Project Director on the UTS 
Project. 
Urban Consortium (U. C.) 
The Urban Consortium is made up of the twenty-eight largest jurisdictions in the 
United States and eight urban counties all of one-half million population or more. They 
cooperate to do the same kinds of things that CTIP and UTS do except their needs are 
somewhat different. The activities of this network are based upon needs of large cities 
and under the assumption that many of the things that they have in common are not in 
common with jurisdictions under the one-half million population level. 
International Urban Technology Exchange Program (IUTEP) 
Under the wing of Public Technology, Incorporated, the Program Committee of 
IUTEP includes participants from each of the National/Regional Networks. This organi-
zation can take a look at technology from foreign countries, evaluate it, and help to 
make it available for utilization in the United States. In the first year of operation by 
IUTEP, $75,000 was committed to get the program started. The organization identified a 
computerized refuse routing system in France. It was modified and installed at St. 
Petersburg, Florida and it is anticipated that savings resulting from the transferred tech-
nology will amount to $100,000 during the first year of use. This is just an example of 
the kind of thing that IUTEP is involved with. George Schrader, City Manager of Dallas, 
Texas is now at work to implement the system in his city. 
Council on International Urban Liaison (CIVL) 
Our office is also sponsoring another international innovation; namely, a Council on 
International Urban Liaison under the direction of John Garvey. This organization tries 
to identify technologies in Europe and elsewhere which may be applicable in the United 
States. They do no evaluation. They simply call technology potentials to the attention 
of city managers in all sizes of cities. Any city manager may scan their information and 
make his own evaluation as to whether or not it should be tried. 
Why Are We Using the Network Concept? 
The network concept is based upon a philosophy expressed by Dr. Everett Rogers 
in his book, Communications of Innovation. He talked about the utilization curve as 
being "S" shaped over time. Applications are few in number and slow to start but, over 
time, reach to full potential. The telephone is a good example although in many parts 
of the world the telephone is not yet extensively used. Dr. Rogers superimposed a uni-
form bell curve on the S curve and used this to illustrate the types of people encountered 
in technology utilization, invention, or innovation. According to Dr. Rogers, the top 
2.5% of the people are likely to be "innovators". The next 13.5% he refers to as early 
adopters although he has since changed the name to "early adapters" because they tend 






He divides the remainder into roughly equal parts and refers to them as the "early 
majority'', late majority", and "laggards". The term "stabilizers" is now commonly 
used as a less negative, descriptive name. 
Dr. Rogers argues that if the innovators and early adopters who are roughly 163 of a 
population start to use an innovation, you cannot stop its use except perhaps by passing 
prohibitive legislation. In concept, other people will look at the 163 who have adopted 
the innovations and will follow their example. 
Our networks are built around this idea. An effort is made to find the jurisdictions 
and individuals that are the innovators and early adopters. Techniques have been devel-
oped to identify innovative and change-agent types of people and organizations. Once 
identified, they appear to be efficient change agents even if they move to another place of 
work. Some city managers have this quality and have been influential in interesting 
others in innovations which they have found to be appropriate. 
Innovation Support From Other Public Sector Organizations 
There are other systems involved with all of the above networks as support mechan-
isms. There is a Mayor's Leadership Institute. It tries to help mayors know about and 
evaluate innovations that can be of value to them. The U. S. Conference of Mayors, a 
local government interest group, has this as one of their primary objectives. 
The National Science Foundation has provided a grant to the International City Mana-
gers Association to identify "in-place" technology which might be of use to others. The 
association evaluates innovations that have been in use at least six months with the hope 
that useful data upon which judgment might be made has been collected. Their monthly 
newspaper includes articles on items that might be of interest to mayors or city managers. 
The National Science Foundation also has provided a grant to the National Association 
of Counties to develop a science and technology forum for counties in the United States. 
As with the other programs, the objective is to help the counties be informed of what is 
going on. 
The National League of Cities has a Small Cities Task Force which is concerned with 
science and technology. The National Science Foundation has provided a grant to 
support this effort also. 
Interrelationships of the Network Effort 
The framework illustrating the interrelationships between the national user networks 













funds: NSF, HUD, 
DOT, HEW, etc. 
It is, of course, apparent that a network cannot exist without resources. There is a 
need for the user's networks to have access to the technology resources and, as the 
resources provide benefits, the funding agencies tend to have increasing reason for provid-
ing support. There have been four regional conferences in which network participants 
have assembled to provide guidance for the National Science Foundation on improving 
the total system. In these conferences, a working paper is generally distributed to each 
attendee prior to the conference. Attendees then make specific recommendations. In the 
most recent conference held in New England, ten specific recommendations were offered 
as follows: 
(1) Need federal and executive recognition of the networks as a viable system. 
(2) The NSF should increase the coordination between NSF, the networks and the 
interested federal agencies - particularly agencies that provide source funds. 
(3) The NSF should make a long-term commitment for continued support (dollar 
resources) for the operation of the networks. Presently, grants are for one or 
two years only. 
( 4) The President and Congress should allocate significant funds for leverage funds 
(share projects on a percentage basis) so that it would be possible to develop 
cost-sharing programs with universities and for the private sector. In particular, 
this effort would be directed toward adoptive engineering, and/or problem-
solution research. 
( 5) A federal order is needed that would mandate that the federal laboratories par-
ticipate in the Federal Laboratory Consortium and that the Inter-Governmental 
Personnel Act should be used extensively to bring people into the network. 
(6) The NSF should make an expanded effort to bring the universities and the 
private sector into the networks. The FLC is doing very well, the international 
technology transfer effort is beginning to be effective. Dr. Al Bisco has joined 
the NSF to try to expand the academic components. 
(7) An effective information exchange systell! needs to be initiated. We have been 
working with Dr. Jolly, California State University, Sacramento, on the informa-
tion network and with Dr. Ron Hereaux of the New England Innovation Group. 
The problem is lack of sufficient funds. 
(8) An effective long·range plan is needed. This has been started. 
(9) There needs to be more representation of local government on the National 
Science Board. At present, most of the board are scientists and academic 
researchers. It is very difficult to explain the need of the local jurisdictions, the 
politics, and other implications. 
(10) More local government officials are needed on ASRA, the Advisory Planning 
Council. ASRA ·is the Directorate with NSF that interfaces with the local 
government technology programs. 
In response to these ten requests, a five to ten-year plan is being developed. It addres-
ses many of the issues that were raised at the New England meeting. As a result of this 




establish a "technology transfer position" and civil service classification in the Federal 
Government. This would provide federal laboratories and other agencies with a technol-
ogy transfer position which might help identify the reward systems in federal agencies. 
In addition to this, an academic program is being addressed to encourage colleges and 
universities to provide education in the areas of technology and information exchange as 
it relates to the management of public sector work. 
Challenges 
Our projects are by nature piece-meal. When people talk about a network, they 
refer to one specific sub-element of a network such as the New England Innovation 
Group or the Urban Consortium, or the Urban Technology System rather than the total 
network. It is difficult to provide a focus on all of the pieces or parts so that the people 
associated with the networks will recognize that they are all part of a single total system 
rather than being autonomous and separate. There have been evidences of individuals in 
different networks being in competition with one another and it is hoped that this sort of 
thing can be avoided. 
Also, it is extremely difficult to secure new funding for our program. The total 
program has been in operation for approximately 4-1/2 years and has received nearly 
$2,500,000 per year. When considered as an expenditure over the entire United States, 
that is not a great deal of money. 
Estimates of the return on investment for the expenditures indicates that the return 
has been high. More work is needed to arrive at better ways to make true evaluations. 
We are confident that as evaluation systems are improved, the value to the public will 
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Purpose 
Efforts to increase the effectiveness of NATO forces and to maintain the U. S. lead in 
critical technologies, combined with recent extensions of U. S. defense strategy have 
introduced new elements into the acquisition of weapons systems by the Department of 
Defense (DoD): 
• A shift in U. S. defense policy towards interdependence with Allies in acquisi-
tion of families of weapons systems. This interdependence includes conducting 
U. S. defense RDT&E in concert with Allies. 
• Increased competition abroad in the area of military hardware combined with a 
recent low level of innovation in U. S. military developments. 
• Increased management involvement in military acquisitions by all levels (e.g., 
Congress, OMB, and OSD). 
• A complex mixture of recent foreign policy initiatives (especially those dealing 
with U.S. - P.R.C. relations) and a significant change in military strategy with 
respect to the U.S.S.R. and in the Persian Gulf area. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine these and other factors which impact the Navy 
weapons acquisition process. The problem for the Navy is to improve U. S. - Allied 
capability by implementing policy changes without impairing the effectiveness of the 
Navy's acquisition process. 
Background 
Figure 1 presents a brief summary of policy developments affecting the Navy acquisi-
tion process. OMB Circular A-109 (April 5, 1976) established a government-wide empha-
sis on increasing innovation in major equipment acquisitions. fo acnieve this goal, the 
government is placing greater emphasis on industry defining foe detailed characteristics of 
the systems in development while focusing its internal resources on defining mission 
requirements. This change significantly reorients the government role in the acquisition 
process since the traditional government role included much greater definition of the 
desired system characteristics. To achieve this increased industry role, a significant trans-
fer of operational and technical information to competing companies is required during 
the competition stage. In addition, A-109 stresses U. S. consideration of all available 
systems including foreign versions, and it encourages foreign industry participation where 
it is appropriate. 
In 1976, U. S. national concern for the aggregate military effectiveness of NATO 
became more acute in light of recent increases in Warsaw Pact military capability. This 
increased capability continues to be of particular concern when coupled with the recent 
decline in the U. S. strategic advantage relative to the U.S.S.R. Recognition of this 
military imbalance led Congress to mandate in DoD appropriation legislation that U. S. 
equipment intended for use in the NATO theatre be standardized or at least interoper-
able with foreign equipment to increase NATO effectiveness. To this end, OSD policy 
dictates consideration of foreign requirements during major program reviews of all U. S. 
acquisition. Further, OSD is attempting to rationalize differences in nationally defined 
system requirements and to implement cooperative development efforts. The net effect 
has been an increasing requirement for foreign involvement in system acquisitions with a 
resultant greater impetus to share advanced U. S. Technology. In 1978, as a part of the 
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TIMING POLICY EXPRESSED FOCUS OF CONCERN INDIVIDUAL IMP ACT 
------
EARLY OMB CIRCULAR A109 • INCREASING INNOVATION • INCREASED COMPETITION 1970s • GREATER EMPHASIS AT SYSTEM THROUGH TRANSFER OF 
CONCEPT; LESS FOCUSING OF KEY TRADE-OFFS TO 
1976 ATTENTION ON TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY 
SYSTEM CONCEPTS 
1976 NATIONAL EMPHASIS • COMMONALITY OF REQUIREMENTS • INCREASED TRUE OPEN ON RATIONALIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDIZATION, & • STRENGTHEN CAP ABILITY FOR COMPETITION 
INTEROPERABILITY ALLIANCE • GREATER FOREIGN (R/S/I) • MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY FOR ALLIED PARTICIPATION 
RESOURCES • GREATER SHARING OF 
• EQUITABLE OPPORTUNITIES ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
IN ACQUISITION PROCESS 
1976-78 INTERIM DOD POLICY • STRICTER CONTROL OF • HEIGHTENE.D CONCERN en ON TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD FOR CONTROL OF TECH-w 
TRANSFER CONTROLS • INCREASED U.S. !NDUSTRY NOLOGY OUTFLOW 
AND SUBSEQUENT COMPETITIVENESS IN 
PRESIDENTIAL INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
REVIEW 
1978-79 EXPORT • INCREASING THE LEVEL OF INTER- • STRICT SCHEDULE FOR 
ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT OF LISTS 
ACT OF 1979 • NARROW THE AREAS OF CONTROL AND FOR CASE REVIEW 
• EASE INDUSTRY LICENSING BURDEN • OCT 80 DEADLINE FOR LIST 
• CREATE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY LIST OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
1979 INTERNATIONAL • INITIATES STUDY OF PROCEDURES AND • RESPONSE BEING PREPARED 
SECURITY ASSISTANCE DISCLOSURE CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER 
ACT OF 1979 OF SENSITIVE WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 
FIGURE 1: SUMMARY OF RECENT ACQUISITION POLICIES 
encouraging foreign access to the technical data packages which accompany competitive 
weapons procurements and access to selected technical symposia and briefings. 
In parallel with these policies aimed at RDT&E cooperation within NATO, DoD has 
emphasized a greater degree of control over critical technology transfers to potential 
adversaries. Such OSD concern has included a closer scrutiny of transfers made to neutral 
and to Allied nations, in order to minimize the risk of retransfer to potential adversaries. 
The interim DoD policy on critical technology transfer issued in 1977 and the recent 
Export Administration Act of 1979 focus U. S. efforts on the identification of the truly 
critical technologies and on conducting case reviews using this list of technologies. 
When the U. S. was technologically more advanced than its allies, control of technol-
ogy was not emphasized. New concepts were emerging fast enough so that trade did not 
endanger the U. S. lead. Commercial and military trade has had the desired positive im-
pact on the U. S. balance of trade with restrictions curtailing only the most advanced 
techniques and products. In the current environment, however, commercial products and 
applications often lead comparable military applications in the level of technological 
sophistication. In order to control the outflow of sophisticated technology, it is neces-
sary to scrutinize commercial trade in both military (FMS) and non-military (dual use) 
products and technologies (manufacturing "know-how"). 
Another important trend is the continued extension of major company ties across 
national boundaries. Most major Western companies have subsidiaries in several countries, 
many with production facilities in very high technology areas. As an example, Boeing has 
established a cooperative development and production agreement with Air Italia for por-
tions of its new 767 aircraft. This joint effort has included a multi-year technology 
transfer effort in graphite epoxy composite materials, an area of high military value. 
Such a business practice may be essential if Boeing is to maintain its share of the export 
market; however, such practices can circumvent controls over such technology in East-
West trade. 
In addition to the above factors, there are other national and international conditions 
which impact Navy acquisitions: 
• The military-security relationship of the U. S. with various nations is changing 
significantly as is the overall U. S. defense strategy through: 
- A shift in the relationship between the U. S. and U.S.S.R. away from the 
spirit, if not practice, of detente. 
- Closer ties with P.R.C. 
- Changing military requirements in the Persian Gulf area. 
- Development of a Rapid Deployment Force. 
• Political and economic aspects of various policy issues are being emphasized over 
military security aspects. 
• Economic resources of Alliance are constrained. This condition includes a 
critical lack of venture capital, low levels of industrial R&D, and a continued 
export emphasis on arms sales. 
• The U. S. is emphasizing third world development through technology transfer. 
Also, many resource-rich countries are acquiring significant technological capa-
bility in exchange for their resources. Thus, third party re transfer has become a 
more significant problem. 
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Acquisition Issues 
The remaining discussion will focus on the implications of international involvement 
on Navy acquisitions. These issues will be highlighted: 
Foreign Cooperation 
• The proposed plan for U.S.-foreign cooperation in NATO programs raises the 
level of complexity for U. S. acquisition efforts. The Navy must therefore 
accommodate a higher level of complexity in its own acquisition process. 
Technology Transfer 
• The cooperative development efforts and military exchange programs will 
require some technology transfers. This issue is particularly sensitive in light of 
the decline in U. S. RDT&E efforts in certain areas. 
• There is a need to identify sensitive military technologies which should be 
controlled through both commercial and munitions export licensing. 
In addition, there will be significant implications for Navy acquisitions resulting from 
recent changes in the relationships between the U. S. and such nations as the U.S.S.R., 
P. R.C., and Iran. The nature of such implications are, as yet, too ill-defined to discuss 
further in this paper. 
Implications 
NATO Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability 
In response to Congressional and Executive mandates over the last five years, the 
Department of Defense has established this policy objective: Equipment procured for 
U. S. forces stationed in Europe under the terms of NATO will be standardized or at 
least interoperable with equipment of other NATO countries. In keeping with this 
objective, DoD is evolving three major approaches to RDT&E and procurement coopera-
tion: 
• Establishment of bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's) with NATO 
member nations which waive "buy national" restrictions. 
• Negotiation of dual production agreements for currently available systems 
and systems in the latter stages of development. 
• Creation of families of weapons for co-development of future systems. 
In addition, NATO is developing a system for coordination of weapons requirements, 
the Periodic Armaments Planning System (PAPS). The PAPS is intended to encourage 
consideration of multinational requirements in all national military development pro-
grams, to identify opportunities for RDT&E collaboration, and to report on planned 
national developments that may support NATO. 
There are a number of issues which must be addressed in order to achieve an effective 
cooperative effort. The foremost issue is the resolution or accommodation of differences 
in mission requirement, geography, operating environment, and timing of new acquisi-
tions. If such differences are not accommodated, the whole effort may lead to a less 
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capable weapons system. Designing a system for a multimissiun capability, for example, 
could seriously compromise its effectiveness in certain specific, but critical missions. 
Such compromises may have, in fact, lessened the capabilities of aircraft like the TFX 
and the Tornado. 
Secondly, there must be better definition of the division of effort between the govern-
ment in negotiation of MOU's and the industry in its negotiation of contracts with 
foreign firms. Industry involvement must be attained in a manner which secures a stable 
industry role (assured markets) while not forcing industry to make concessions which 
could reduce commercial competitiveness. To this end, government attention should be 
placed on selecting permissible third country sales of cooperatively developed or produced 
systems. The introduction of very advanced technologies into such systems may further 
complicate such government agreements. Detailed industry-to-industry licensing agree-
ments will be required to ensure against adverse transfers. 
Since many of the key technologies which are candidates for cooperative development 
projects come from commercial RDT&E, U. S. industry will attempt to guard its technol-
ogical edge in these areas. NATO MOU's could have the effect of forcing unnecessary 
transfers between U. S. and foreign companies. U. S. industry should not be placed in the 
position of deciding whether to forego its military business or whether to foresake its 
own long-term interests by transferring manufacturing "know-how". 
The third area of concern is the difference between the acquisition and contracting 
styles of the NATO countries. The U. S. emphasizes competitive procurements to achieve 
the maximum system effectiveness for a given budget level. In contrast, many Euuipean 
defense ministries view procurement from economic and employment perspectives. A 
method for a beneficial interfacing of the U. S. concept of "open" competition with the 
directed procurement concepts of many allies is crucial for efficient and equitable coop-
eration. There are also substantive procedural differences between U. S. and Europeftn 
military acquisition processes in: 
• Industrial standards (e.g., safety, reliability, quality assurance) 
• Contracts (U. S. clauses of concern include unemployment insurance, union 
laws, anti-trust, data rights, EEO, EPA, OSHA, small business set-asides, and 
mobili'zation agreements) 
• Accounting Practices and Reporting 
• Litigation Procedures 
• Fiscal Constraints (single year appropriation in the U. S. vs. multi-year in selected 
European Nations) 
Many of the above differences can be resolved through effective administration. 
The sheer number of disparities, however, argues for the establishment of a single multi-
national control agency for their resolution. 
Differences between the U. S. and other NATO countries in acquired data rights be-
come very important in the context of codevelopment or coproduction. Within the U. S., 
the government normally procures the rights from an industry to establish second sources 
for military systems. Such is not the case for many European defense ministries. Owner-
ship of the "intellectual" property resulting from defense RDT&E remains with the com-
pany. Ever in the U. S., full data rights for commercially developed technology and for 
much of the technology furnished through subcontracting are not normally procured. If 






Another vital concern to the U. S. is the guaranteed availability of a production and 
mobilization base to cover wartime surge conditions. With the transfer of developments 
outside the U. S., such a mobilization base may be extremely hard to maintain. Within 
the U. S., it will be increasingly difficult to maintain specialty production facilities such 
as those for tank turrets, ship nuclear propulsion, and heavy steel handling. Economies 
of scale will be harder to achieve with the increased number of parallel production 
facilities particularly in areas where there is little outside commercial incentive. 
One effect of NATO R/S/1 in cooperative weapon systems acquisitions could be to 
force the melding of U. S. and foreign industry into an aggregate industrial base. This 
melding could reduce or even eliminate important areas of the U. S. technology lead and 
force a reliance on foreign industry for mobilization. The alternative to such a leveling 
process is the establishment of very elaborate government infrastructure whose responsi-
bility would be to organize international interchange among companies. This alternative 
could contribute to the use of less economical production facilities. 
The Navy is concerned that there could be adverse national security implications and 
increased developmental complexity resulting from such a high level of cooperation with 
NATO nations. There is anxiety within the acquisition community that the very advanced 
technologies available within the U. S. which are applicable to advanced systems may 
be either 1) compromised through cooperative development, or 2) eliminated from con-
sideration due to their sensitivity or due to high development and/or transfer risk, thus 
limiting the performance potential of future U. S. systems. 
Figure 2 summarizes the successful aspects of several recent U. S./foreign co-develop-
ment efforts and highlights the more important problem areas. The aggregate experience 
gained from these efforts reveals the following insights: 
1) An early commitment by all nations participating to buy the system when in 
production is essential to insure a smooth development effort. This commit-
ment should include agreement on the key aspects of the mission need and a 
commitment to a predetermined development and production budget. 
2) The creation of government and industry management structures is needed for 
each cooperative effort to resolve differences in system requirements an.d to con-
trol system evolution, contracting details, configuration, and testin(fand evalua-
tion. 
3) A working partnership between industry and government, with each partner 
designated a specific role, is needed to implement any cooperative effort effec-
tively. The government should concentrate on mission definition and testing 
and evaluation and should work to facilitate the processing of industry licenses 
for international contracting. Industry should negotiate the appropriate con-
tracts and licensing agreements, and make the actual exchanges of development 
or production know-how necessary for foreign industry involvement. 
4) The desired controls on technology transfer must be very explicitly defined and 
must be provided to the industry involved to avoid inadvertant transfers. 
5) A concerted effort must be undertaken to overcome important national differ-
ences in: 
• Competitive procurements 




NATO Sea Sparrow 
(Ship-based Surface· 
to-Air Missile System 
for Point Defense) 
Rolling Airframe Missile 
(Ship-based Surface-to· 
Air Missile System for 
Point Defense) 
SUCCESSFUL ASPECTS 
Selection of Prime Easy Since Air-to-Air Missile 
Existed Prior to Program 
Early Commitment to Production 
Equitable Sharing of Developments Burden 
No Complications at DSARC Milestones Due to 
A-109 Style Decision-Making 
Technology Transfer and Balance of Payment 
Issues Settled Early (Complicated Later by 
Desires to Transfer Sparrow Updates· RE.1-7FM 
U.S. Prime Independently Involved F.R.G. 
Companies (Not Through Competition) in 103 
of the work 
PROBLEM AREAS 
Highlighted Differences in Required Amount of Testing and 
Evaluation (U.S. Requires Much More) 
No Early Commitment to Production 
FRG Desires STINGER Technology 
In order to Balance F.R.G./U.S. Investment, Uneconomical 
Dual Production is Likely 
Contractor-to-Contractor Colocation Risks Inadvertent 
Technology Transfer (Beyond RAM Level) 
Problems with Differences in Accounting Practice 
Time Delay Associated with Negotiation of Engineering 
Development MOU 
No Resolution (as yet) of T&E Plans 
.............................................................................................................. 
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IM-1 Advanced Tank 
SUCCESSFUL ASPECTS 
U.S. Saved Two Years and Significant RDT&E 
Investment 
PROBLEM AREAS 
Problems of Transferring Design (U.S. to Europe or the 
Reverse) Due to Differences in Industry Production 
Technique 
Desire by Industry to Improve the Product During the 
Transfer 
......................................................................................................... -..... . 
Roland (Ground-based 
Surface-to-Air Missile) 
Created a Novel Multinational Group to Further 
Interoperability 
U.S. Learned that Mature Systems in European Context 
are not Necessarily Mature in the U.S. Context - Made 
Technology Transfer Complex 
Transfer of Technical Data Package was Tedious 
Highlighted Differences in Standards (MILSPEC) 
Differences in Radar Requirements (e.g., ECCM) Led to 
Parallel Development Paths 
................................................................................................................ 
National Tactical c3 
Systems 
Unanimous Agreement on Need for Enhancing 
NATO 
High Level of Cooperation is Occuring Through 
Several NATO Fora 
U.S. Industry is Worried That an Aggregate NATO c3 
Program Would Adversely Effect Their Business (U.S. 
Electronics Equipment is Used Throughout Europe) 
·············································································································· 
Note: Data drawn from ICAF Report, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI), The Family of Weapons Concept, 
7 June 1979. 
FIGURE 2: DISCUSSION OF FIVE CASE EXAMPLES OF 
U.S./FOREIGN CO-DEVELOPMENT 
• Contract administration and accounting 
• Definition of a "mature" system 
• Scope and nature of the required testing and evaluation 
The NATO Sea Sparrow is probably the most successful cooperative development 
effort of the five listed in Figure 2. Two aspects of this program contributed to its success. 
First, the basic weapons system requirements were defined around an existing U. S. air-
to-air missile. The availability of this missile provided a substantial focus for the efforts 
of the international control group to define the desired combat system capability. 
Secondly, all of the nations involved made an early commitment to production buys 
of the system. The industry participants thus were provided with the incentive of a de-
fined market. This program, as well as all of the others listed, encountered difficulty 
during the test and evaluation process since each nation had different requirements for 
approving a "mature" system, those of the U. S. being the most demanding. 
None of the programs listed in Figure 2 included the concept formulation stage in the 
international process. In each case, one of the nations involved had a prototype system 
which provided the basic capability. The family of weapons concept proposed for new 
programs will be based on international agreement of specific mission needs early in con-
cept formulation. Without the focus provided by an available prototype, achieving such 
agreement is expected to be quite difficult. 
The problems of controlling technology transfer were highlightert in the Sea Sparrow, 
RAM, and Roland cases. In each of these cases, U. S. industry proposed system concepts 
which contained sensitive technology (the monopulse Sparrow guidance, the STINGER 
guidance, and advanced radar ECCM technology, respectively). U. S. attempts to control 
such technology have been countered with significant foreign pressure for their transfer. 
Regardless of U. S. government attempts at control, a great deal of advanced U. S. tech-
nology has been transferred through these programs. Future controls over such technol-
ogy may not be feasible due to the expected extent of cooperation. 
Finally, the listed cases provide examples of different management structures. From a 
review of these cases, it is evident that a multinational government body is required for 
each program to resolve differences in system requirements, contracting, manufacturing 
methods, testing and evaluation, and system configuration control. Further, a mechanism 
will be needed to allow nations to follow slightly divergent acquisition paths rather than 
forcing the rationalization of all possible differences. 
Technology Transfer 
In September of 1979, Congress enacted a new Export Administration Act. This 
act mandated that the Department of Defense develop a list of militarily critical technol-
ogies which will be subject to export controls. An interim list of critical technologies will 
be published in the Federal Register by 1 October 1980. This act is the result of a five-
year DoD emphasis on controlling adverse transfers in technologies of high military value. 
The act is specific in its criteria for disapproval of export licenses: 
• The export of such goods or technology will make a significant contribution 
to the military potential of the recipient country, and 
• Such a contribution will prove detrimental to the national security of the 
United States. 
The transfers of concern include those commercial transactions and military exchanges 
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where there is an increased risk of inadvertent transfer or retransfer of critical technol-
ogies to potential adversaries. Governmental control mechanisms which now exist to 
achieve this end are summarized below: 
Commercial Control of "Arms, Ammunitions, and Implements of War" 
• International traffic in arms regulation (ITAR) (Commonly called Munitions List) 
defines the areas of control. 
• Controls are maintained to all countries including Allies. 
• The Navy reviews 1,500 cases per year. 
Strategic Trade Control 
• Export Administration Act of 1979 and the Commercial Commodities List (CCL) 
define the controls. 
• Controls emphasize commercial trade to communist countries. 
• The Navy reviews 200 cases per year. 
Allied Strategic Trade Control 
• COCOM (Coordinating Committee) defines agreed upon controls to Communist 
countries. 
• The Navy reviews 200 cases per year (Foreign requests for exception to COCOM 
List). 
Foreign Military Sales 
• This mechanism includes trade in military equipment and technology through 
government to government channels. 
Judgements, on which transfers are or are not prudent must be based on a firm under-
standing of the impact of specific technologies on mission capabilities, both from the per-
spective of the U. S. and of its potential adversaries. The accomplishment of this task 
requires the participation of the system and technology experts who have a comprehen-
sive understanding of the relationship of military capability with technology, and of the 
intelligence community, which has a detailed knowledge of the areas of weakness and 
strength of potential adversaries. 
The burden of presenting such analyses to decision-makers normally falls upon individ-
ual program managers who have access to such experts. To assist these offices and to 
provide a Navy-wide perspective, the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) is developing an 
organization to identify and analyze critical technologies. This organization is an exten-
sion of current Navy /NA VMAT efforts to draw upon the wide range of technical resources 
within the Navy RDT&E community. It includes two principal thrusts: 
• A questionnaire, distributed to all Navy program managers, which: 
- relates operational capability to systems, subsystems, devices, and the under-
lying technology; and 
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provides judgmental information on the criticality of the underlying tech-
nologies 
• Formation of groups of technical experts from Navy laboratories and industry 
to make assessments of: 
the key parameters of military significance, 
the U. S. state-of-the-art and that of potential adversaries, and 
foreign availability. 
The questionnaire and the convening of experts are designed to be interactive - the 
questionnaire will focus the efforts of the expert groups on key aspects of each technol-
ogy area, and the expert groups will identify other systems to be examined in more 
detail with the aid of the widely distributed questionnaire (500 · 1,000 systems). 
The laboratory expert groups will be formed in key Navy technologies. These experts 
will spend only a short period in actual group participation with the meetings designed 
specifically to sensitize the experts to technology transfer issues. These experts can be 
then called on in the future to help with case reviews in narrow technical areas which 
require a level of knowledge more detailed than that which is normally required of an 
export control analyst. The product of these efforts will be a preliminary list of critical 
technologies to support both Navy program managers and policy-makers. 
The desired end result of the directed emphasis on controlling technology transfer is 
a shift from the current ad hoc implementation of controls to a more structured effort: 
CURRENT 
Product Control Emphasis. 
Control Decisions Often Made without 
Adequate Technical Rationale. 
Untimely and Inconsistent Case-by-
Case Decision-Making. 
Ad-Hoc Decision and Policy-Making 
Process. 
No Corporate Memory. 
Summary 
DESIRED 
Technology Control Emphasis. 
High Level Policy Attention Combined 
with Inputs from Technical Experts. 
Timely and Consistent Decisions 
Based on Established Policy. 
Reproducible and Coordinated Policy. 
Making Process. 
Stable Involvement of Navy Experts 
Along with Structured Navy Technol-
ogy Transfer Data Base. 
The Navy and DoD acquisition process is being affected by U. S. policy changes 
which promise improved overall defense capabilities for the U. S. and its allies to meet 
potential threats. Increased cooperation with our allies in development and production 
of weapons systems can result in greater rationalization, standardization, and interoper-
ability in U. S. and Allied forces, but it will increase the complexity of their weapons 
acquisition and may extend the times to initial operational capability. In order to improve 
the U. S. balance of payments position, Congress has placed increased responsibility on 
DoD to justify control of weapons and technology, the transfer of which will prove 
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detrimental to U. S. national security. Recent tightening of control of exports to U.S.S.R. 
and steps to improve U. S. military deployment capabilities will affect program managers 
during a period of tightly constrained budgets. These policy changes will: 
Increase the Level of Competition WHILE 
in U. S. Acquisitions 
Increase the Overall Level of U.S. WHILE 
Industry Participation 
Share Advanced Military Technol- WHILE 
ogy with Allies even with the 
Heightened Risks of Retransfer to 
Potential Adversaries 
Emphasize Mission Needs Definition WHILE 
and Innovative Concept Formulation 
Emphasize Transfer of Technical WHILE 
Data to Allies 
Require Changes in Force Objec- WHILE 
tives and Programs 
Encouraging Certain "Directed Foreign 
Acquisitions 
Sharing Advanced Technology with 
Foreign Industry 
Maintaining Stricter Controls Over 
Technology to Potential Adversaries 
Continuing Negotiations for Interna-
tional "Families of Weapons" 
Not Altering the National Disclosure 
Policy 
Permitting No Significant Latitude in 
Budgetary Levels. 
The Navy and NA VMAT, in particular, are attempting to deal with these issues for the 
acquisition program and to assist individual program managers in addressing the diversity 
of questions arising at key milestones. 
The program manager is the individual who must implement policy while his actions 
are closely scrutinized. A structured process must be evolved which: 
• Reconciles differences in requirements, 
• Resolves issues and/or defines national disclosure and technology transfer policy, 
• Allows the definition of contracting details, and 
• Provides a U. S. and multinational forum for resolution of various levels of dis-
agreement which arise. 
The burden of resolving many specific details with regard to a particular program falls 
upon the program manager. He cannot be expected to understand the full implications of 
foreign involvement. Navy-wide support must be developed to assist him. To this end, 
Navy operational policy and technical experts must make a concerted effort to: 
1. Meet the complexities of international participation in R/S/l. 
2. Evaluate the military value of technological growth in the context of interna-
tional cooperative efforts and determine the risks of technology transfers to 
potential adversaries. 
3. Understand how technology is transferred. 
4. Encourage Navy-wide technical evaluations at key acquisition decisions. 
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This paper presents an analysis of technology transfer that considers the fact that the 
word "innovation" is a noun and is also a verb. The verb concept is expanded and 
developed. A third concept of technology transfer, capacity building, is then introduced. 
A paradigm or check list of micro factors helpful in capacity building is given. 
Introduction 
The innovation process is viewed by many as an academic theory. This is not a realis-
tic view. Technology change must occur in the everyday world of business, government, 
and industry. 
When an executive thinks about innovation, it is usually in terms of a specific overt 
planned change, such as a single item of technology or a single method, that has been put 
to use. This is only one aspect of innovation. 
Objective 
The first objective of this paper is to call attention to the fact that innovation is both: 
1) a new idea, method or device, or 2) the introduction of something new. Innovation 
may be either a noun or a verb. 
A second objective is to briefly review the innovation process (the verb innovation), 
the structure of the innovation process, and the importance of innovative capacity build-
ing. 
The third objective is to expand the innovation process model to include a mechanism 
for innovation capacity building and to investigate the capacity building mechanism as a 
managerial tool. 
Economics 
Although an improved climate for innovation is desirable, it should be noted that the 
government and industry have adopted many innovations over time. According to the 
U. S. Department of Commerce (PB-263-806, p. 187), it has been estimated that tech-
nological innovation was responsible for 45% of the Nation's economic growth between 
1929 and 1969 (a forty year periocl). 
The problem is that too often experimental prototypes are developed and abandoned. 
Many inventions have been tested, but for one reason or another, have not met with wide-
spread acceptance. In some instances, inventions generated within the United States have 
been adopted abroad and, at least for a time, ignored at home. No industry or segment of 
the U. S. government is unique in this respect. Less than one-half of all proposed innova-
tions are successfully adopted within most organizations. 
Regardless of the track record of a specific segment of the U. S. economy, with respect 
to the introduction of technological change, there is general agreement that steps should 
be taken to improve. The role of the innovation process is important in maintaining a 
competitive stance, a healthy and expanding economy and is essential to the long-term 
survival of the United States. 
Definition 
The noun innovation commonly is used to refer to a new thing, whether it be a new 
piece of equipment or a new technique or a new procedure. The concept of newness 
need only apply to the user. The device, technique, or procedure may have been well 
known in other applications or the same application in other industries or organizations. 
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Analysis 
Regardless of whether the innovation is a device or technique or procedure, an innova-
tion has three components. There is the technical component, the innovating component, 
and the capacity building or embedding component (Pelz, 1978). The technical compo· 
nent of an innovation is the device, technique or procedure itself. The innovating com-
ponent generally refers to the problem or opportunity identification, solution selection, 
plan, and implementation. The third component, the capacity building, is the organiza-
tional change and behavioral acceptance that makes it possible for the innovation to be 
used in a productive manner in the new environment. The discussion that follows will 
expand on each of these components of innovation. 
Innovation (noun) Component 
Innovation is not synonymous with invention. Inventions are newly created products 
or techniques. In contrast, innovation simply refers to something that is new to a given 
industry, business or activity. Thus, an innovation adopted by industry could conceiv-
ably be some thing or some method that, for example, the Navy had used for decades. 
Also, the word innovation (noun) refers to devices, processes, techniques, and methods. 
Consequently, an innovation can be any new component of a system, including person-
nel related factors and machinery, as well as the management procedures for handling 
hardware and software. A new computer, a new computer program, a new inventory 
form, a new personnel work schedule, or a new organizational structure change within 
an organization or division of an organization - all can be considered innovations. 
Innovation (verb) Component 
There is no firm blueprint for the innovation process. Neverless, it is useful to examine 
the sequence of events that commonly occur when an institution, company or industry 
innovates. By identifying the stages of the process, it is possible to highlight the acts or 
actions necessary to cause a successful innovation to occur. The delineation of stages is 
somewhat arbitrary, and each stage can be divided and/or subdivided. The most logical 
is to place the stages in a chronological sequence; however, it should be remembered that 
positions of adjacent stages may overlap, whole sections may be omitted, individual 
stages may be repeated, and recycling to earlier stages may occur. 
The four major stages of innovation (the verb): 
1. recognition and definition of a problem or opportunity 
2. solution identification and selection 
3. planning and adaptive engineering 
4. implementation 
Recognition and Definition 
The first stage of the innovation process, recognition and definition, begins with the 
appreciation that there is an opportunity to innovate or a need to innovate. Then, the 
specific innovation that best meets the need or best exploits the opportunity must be 
discovered and selected. Much of the literature on innovation is oriented primarily 
toward problem solving. Yet, an examination of the history of technological change in 
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industry provides many illustrations of major innovations that have been adopted not 
because they provided a solution to an immediate, pressing economic or organizational 
problem, but because they promised an organization or activity better future growth, 
greater efficiency, more security, or other desirable returns. 
There are many noteworthy examples of opportunity innovations, steam power, 
diesel power, radio, TV, solid state, integrated circuits, or microwave heating, are but a 
few. 
Solution Identification 
The number and type of alternative considerations will depend directly on the avail-
ability of venture capital, the interest of management in seeking changes, the quality of 
available labor, the receptivity of the organization to change, as well as the user's percep-
tion of potential benefits. Technology transfer may occur at any time, however, the 
benefits of an effective technology transfer system may be appreciated best during the 
solution identification phase. 
The effort necessary, especially to seek out and to evaluate potential alternatives is 
frequently under-estimated. Most of the failures of attempted innovation result from mis-
judgements made during this stage of the innovation process (Sweezy, 1978). 
Planning and Adaptive Engineering 
During the planning part of the third stage, a set of precise guidelines must be formula-
ted to give concrete shape to the market, technical, performance, environmental, and per-
sonnel requirements of the proposed innovation. An important component of this phase 
is the search for additional information on existing technology that may be relevant to 
the proposed innovation. Frequently, it is possible to draw upon an existing pool of 
technological and/or marketing practices to satisfy some of the planning requirements. 
This information may come from inside the organization or from other organizations 
that may or may not be technically related. 
The second part of the third stage suggests that, in some cases, there may be a need for 
adaptive engineering. It is the rule rather than the exception that some adaptive engineer-
ing will be necessary. Changes, modifications, and/or interface relationships may be 
necessary in devices, processes and concepts. Recognizing the need for adaptive engineer-
ing and assuring the availability of the resources for its implementation is a managerial 
responsibility. 
Implementation 
The objective is to insure that the innovation is successfully utilized. A key concept of 
this stage is to develop a method of dtviding the implementation into steps. Pilot pro-
grams, limited tests, prototypes, feasibility studies are all possible approaches. The trial 
phase is sometimes omitted for one reason or another. Perhaps an over zealous manager, 
eager to correct a problem or capitalize on an opportunity, may order the innovation 
into effect without trial results. Under these conditions, the probability of success can be 
expected to decline markedly. Early failure of a proposed innovation may prevent further 
modification, proper testing, or effective adaptive efforts. 
The trial evaluation procedure is an appropriate part of implementation. Generally 





As previously stated, the third component and perhaps the least understood, is the 
capacity building component. The question under discussion is: "What actions can a 
, manager take to develop a total organizational environment that will spontaneously 
and continuously seek out and introduce new ideas?" A manager can cause innovation 
to occur by executive directive. This approach is not spontaneous. Further, such action 
is probably not cost effective because such an approach would demand a substantial 
amount of managerial time and attention. A more effective approach would be to 
determine the factors that provide a favorable environment for the introduction of 
change, and then attempt to insure that they are present in ample quantity. Under 
these circumstances, it seems logical that there would be a much improved likelihood 
that spontaneous and continuous innovation would occur. The organizational factors 
that are most important, in terms of providing a favorable environment for innovation, 
have been identified. Experience and research strongly suggest that a manager can 
modify the organizational environment, through well planned and overt actions such 
that the likelihood of spontaneous and continuous innovation will be the norm rather 
than the exception. 
The organizational capacity to seek, introduce, and successfully adopt an innovation 
can be expected to vary greatly from organization to organization. This organizational 
capacity will vary depending upon the nature of the product, the intensity of competition, 
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· the age of the industry, the economic structure, and a host of other variables. These are 
macro considerations. What may be more useful to a manager, in terms of developing 
innovative capacity, is a paradigm or check list of micro factors. Organizational and 
personnel factors that can be measured and, if desirable, be modified to fit the particu-
lar need. Such a paradigm is shown as Figure 1. The simple application of conventional 
wisdom will in most cases lead to a logical conclusion that the paradigm is realistic and 
useful. Studies have been made to examine further and possibly support the selection of 
and definitions of each element shown in Figure 1. The following discussion will be used 
to expand and clarify each element (Jolly, Creighton, George, 1978). 
1. Method of Information Documentation 
This refers to the format, the language, the report complexity, and the docu-
mentation system. The manager, scientist, and engineer each has a limited amount of time 
that may be devoted to reading information which may be useful in terms of innova-
tion. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the documentation, it is desirable to adopt 
techniques based on good marketing principles. For example, the Navy's Civil Engineering 
Laboratory at Port Hueneme, California has a procedure whereby several levels of users 
are considered In addition to the conventional project report, a series of technical notes 
and simplified specifications are prepared The documentation is adjusted to meet the 
needs of the expected user. 
2. The Distribution System 
Technology must flow from the source to the user in order to find application. 
The physical flow of technology is dependent upon the number of entries and the ease of 
access as well as the formal distribution plan. A primary measure of the effectiveness of 
the technology information system is its capacity to allow people with problems to get in 
touch with people or records with potential solutions (Knox, 1973). 
The distribution system has many forms. The primary distribution system is person to 
person; however, consideration needs to be given to journals, direct mail, meetings, con-
ferences, and workshops. These are all effective methods and need to be selected and 





Method of Information 
Documentation 
The Distribution System 
Formal Organization of the 
User 
Selection Process for Projects 
(Users' Contribution) 
INFORMAL FACTORS 
Capacity of the Receiver 
Informal Linkers in the 
Receiving Organization 
Credibility as Viewed by 
the Receiver 
Perceived Reward to the 
Receiver 
Willingness to be helped 
Figure I. A Paradigm of Factors Influencing the Introduction of Innovation 
This paradigm is important to a manager because the magnitude and/or effectiveneu 
of each factor is important in evaluating the organizational environmem in terms of its 
ability to introduce an innovation. 
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3. The Formal Organization of the User 
A comfortable organizational climate is often a climate of stability. However," ... 
the stable state as applied to organization, is the enemy of adoptive change ... "(Schone, 
1967). The determination of an attitude, to accept or reject change by a formal organiza-
tion, can produce an insight into the organization's expected utilization of new ideas. 
Stephenson, Ganz, and Erickson (1974) reported the responses of 109 scientists and 
engineers from the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California in terms of their 
perceptions of management creating conflicting forces for change. Forty respondents felt 
that their organization occasionally or often acted as a barrier to the use of new ideas. 
4. Project Selection Process 
Rogers and Jain (1969) have shown that " ... a basic reason for the lack of 
research utilization is that the process is often begun with the research process, rather 
than the clients' needs ... ". There is an obvious benefit of increasing the potential utility 
of research through collaboration. In addition, users or receivers become more commit-
ted much earlier to the technology transfer effort. It is important to integrate market 
and economic information with technical information. Also, it is often advantageous to 
promote collaboration in order to prevent over or under adaptive engineering. There 
should be a two-direction flow of information, i.e., Research and Development to the 
User and, in reverse, Potential User to Research and Development. 
5. Capacity of the Receiver or User 
This factor refers to the ability and capability of the potential user to utilize new 
and/or innovative ideas. There are three aspects of capacity to consider, i.e., skills, 
education, and traits. High technology ideas often require the practice of new skills. The 
potential user organization may resist the new idea because of inability to provide trained 
workers. The vision to perceive and logical benefit from an innovation may be directly 
related to the educational level of the persons in the receiver organization. Highly educa-
ted managers can and do apply scientific analysis and reach rational decisions generally 
devoid of fear of the unknown. Further, there are several socio-psychological attributes 
that tend to expand the capacity of an individual in terms of technology transfer. 
Loy (1969, p. 77), found that venturesomeness, professional status, imaginativeness, 
educational status, dominance, sociability, and cosmopolitaness were significant. Self-
sufficiency was also significant, but to a lesser extent. 
6. Informal Linkers in the User Organization 
This refers to the presence of, and/or the effects of, individuals in the receiving 
organization who link or couple persons in their organization to outside ideas, concepts, 
and new devices. Linkers are persons who operate in the same organization or allied 
organizations (with social overlap) as those persons who will actually use the new tech-
nology. Linkers are sometimes called gatekeepers, opinion leaders, information sources, 
or early knowers of knowledge. Linkers are not necessarily superior technical persons, 
rather they are knowledge sources. 
The research and user communities are separate problem-solving systems and, there-
for, require a two-way communication linkage in order to foster effective research utili-
zation. Linkers mediate between their organizational colleagues and the organization's 
outside world. The linker effectively couples the user organization to the scientific 
and technological world at large. It is the linker's function to bring into his organization 
relevant information. 
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7. Credibility as Viewed by the Receiver 
The receiver will consciously or unconsciously assign a credibility to the technical 
information that relates to potential innovations. Because individuals have difficulty dis-
tinguishing between the source or origin of a message and the channel which carried that 
message, the individual will attach a composite credibility to a message derived from both 
perceived source and perceived channel reliability. Thus, the character of the group or 
individual originating the idea or performing the research and development function and 
the vehicle (person or mechanism) transporting the information, will be important factors 
in determining how fast the idea, concept, or device gets adopted. 
The total concept of credibility can be subdivided into several dimensions such as 
perceived expertness, reliability, intentions, creativity, and farsightedness. How the 
potential user reacts to the information and whether the potential user decides to adopt 
it are considerably affected by the perceived credibility. 
8. Perceived Reward to the Receiver 
As Lingwood and Morris (1976, p. 121) commented, " ... rewards are the glue 
which holds organizations together and provides the response to individual needs for 
recognition of accomplishments ... ". Conventional wisdom reminds us that how the 
reward structure of an organization is perceived by an individual will have a great impact 
on idea flow and the adoption of innovations. 
A manager's check list of possible rewards to an individual must consider both extrin-
sic and intrinsic rewards. The extrinsic rewards are good salary, higher administrative 
authority, and favorable working conditions. The extrinsic rewards are related to the 
work itself such as opportunity to use skills, intellectual challenge, freedom to follow 
ideas, and peer recognition. 
Intrinsic rewards apparently have considerably more strength as a means to motivate 
persons to consider and to introduce new ideas, concepts, and devices. 
9. Willingness to be Helped 
Willingness relates to the individuals ability and/or desire to accept change. 
Awareness, even firsthand knowledge of a new and/or innovative idea, is not sufficient 
to assure its use. There must be a willingness and interest or, perhaps more significantly, 
an internal motivation to utilize a better method, process, or device. 
Gallup (1955, p. 233) pointed out, " ... persons with vested interest, ... will see to 
it that mental road blocks are put in front of every pew idea which deprives them of 
prestige or power ... ". Some of the factors that may cause a person to resist change are 
a threat to: financial return, sense of personal satisfaction, feelings of competency, change 
in normal operations, and many others. 
It is useful to recognize that " ... although an idea may have been accepted intellec-
tually, normally a long period of time passes before it is incorporated into the thinking of 




During the course of this paper, attention was directed to the fact that innovation is 
both a new idea, method, or device and the introduction of something new. Innovation 
may be either a noun or a verb. 
The innovating process (verb) was scrutinized. Using the classical scientific analysis 
approach, the innovating component was subdivided and further analyzed. 
A third component of innovation, the organizational capacity to spontaneously and 
continuously introduce change, was identified and discussed. 
Finally, a paradigm or check list of organizational factors that are most important, 
in terms of providing a favorable environment for innovation, were identified and care-
fully explained. 
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The objective of this technology transfer meeting has been carried out. We wanted to 
show you the full gamut. I think that you can appreciate that we have accomplished our 
objective. We have gone from Captain Hueber on international or global technology 
transfer to the community technology transfer by Bruce Reiss of National Science 
Foundation, with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command activity in between and 
with the Forest Service along the way. 
I am glad that no definition was given at the very beginning of the conference. Each 
of us has a definition, but it is my hope that your definition has been broadened by 
seeing other problems and other techniques. 
I would like to leave you with the idea that this group today has a responsibility. Each 
of you has a responsibility to your own organization to get technology to the user and to 
get it used. You can't waste research dollars. The research output must be used by your 
organization. 
In addition, you people here from the federal government have a responsibility to the 
taxpayers to see that the results, from the expenditure of federal dollars, are utilized by 
federal, state, and local government and by industry. These results are too much of a 
national asset to let them remain in the laboratory system. You must assist to get the 
technology out of the laboratory and see that it is used to the bettennent of the nation 
and to benefit the taxpayers. 
Thank you for attending today. We appreciate your participation. Perhaps we will 
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